

JPRS-EER-91-001
2 JANUARY 1991



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

East Europe

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8

19980121 177

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-001

CONTENTS

2 January 1991

POLITICAL

BULGARIA

| | |
|---|---|
| BSP Theoretical Monthly on Political Changes, June Elections [NOVO VREME Sep] | 1 |
| Financing of Former Communist Youth Group Questioned | 6 |
| Accounts Detailed [168 CHASA 9 Oct] | 6 |
| Real Estate, Hard Currency [168 CHASA 9 Oct] | 7 |

HUNGARY

| | |
|---|----|
| Italian Investor Eyes TV Channel, Stores [Paris LE MONDE 12 Nov] | 8 |
| Constitutional Court: Institution, Authority Challenged | 8 |
| Court Performs Legislative Function [MAGYAR KOZLONY 31 Oct] | 8 |
| 'Reminiscent of Party State' [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 3 Nov] | 8 |
| Court Should Be Abolished [MAGYAR NEMZET 23 Nov] | 9 |
| Constitutional Court: Judge Responds to Challenge [MAGYAR NEMZET 28 Nov] | 10 |
| Legislative Draft Related to Police Completed [MAGYAR NEMZET 27 Nov] | 11 |
| Local Government Representatives Dissatisfied With Law [MAGYAR NEMZET 27 Nov] | 12 |
| MDF Board: Courts Pozsgay, Divided on Internal Party Issues [NEPSZABADSAG 19 Nov] | 13 |
| French Jewish Leader Regards MDF Conduct as Proper [NEPSZABADSAG 24 Nov] | 14 |

POLAND

| | |
|--|----|
| POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup [POLITYKA 17 Nov] | 14 |
| Lipski on Need To Unite Socialist Parties [ZYCIE WARSZAWY 26 Oct] | 16 |
| Country's Splintered Socialist Parties Unite [TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC 2 Nov] | 18 |
| Opole Senator Attacks Union of Expellees' Koschyk on Minority Issue [ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25 Oct] | 18 |
| Eastern Border Groups Stress Ethnic Issues | 20 |
| Janowicz on Belorussian Party [TRYBUNA 25 Oct] | 20 |
| Minority Complaints in Bielsk [TRYBUNA 26 Oct] | 22 |
| Lemkos Seek Historical Rights, Affirm Loyalty to Polish Republic [RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Oct] | 24 |

YUGOSLAVIA

| | |
|---|----|
| Croatian Democratic Party Calls for Independent Army [START 13 Oct] | 27 |
|---|----|

ECONOMIC

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

| | |
|--|----|
| Overview of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe [Budapest NEPSZABADSAG 7 Nov] | 33 |
|--|----|

HUNGARY

| | |
|--|----|
| New Minimum Wage Analyzed [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 8 Sep] | 33 |
|--|----|

POLAND

| | |
|---|----|
| Dutch Firm To Market Polish Products [RZECZPOSPOLITA 24 Oct] | 35 |
| Rise in Rural Unemployment Rates Seen [RZECZPOSPOLITA 24 Oct] | 35 |
| Unemployment Benefit Changes Planned [RZECZPOSPOLITA 27-28 Oct] | 37 |

| | | |
|---|------------------------------|----|
| Radio Solidarity Programming Chief on New Station | [TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC 2 Nov] | 37 |
| Lignite: Prospects, Power Plant Use Examined | [RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Oct] | 39 |
| Fruit Crop Losses Lead to Steadily Decreasing Exports | [RZECZPOSPOLITA 24 Oct] | 41 |

SOCIAL

HUNGARY

| | | |
|---|----------------------------|----|
| Israeli Press Attache on Interstate Relations | [REFORM 23 Nov] | 43 |
| Poverty Situation, Inequities Analyzed | [HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 8 Sep] | 43 |

POLAND

| | | |
|---|-----------------------------|----|
| Clericalism Seen as Potential Problem for Society | [GAZETA WYBORCZA 20-21 Oct] | 44 |
|---|-----------------------------|----|

BULGARIA

BSP Theoretical Monthly on Political Changes, June Elections

91BA0053A Sofia NOVO VREME in Bulgarian Sep 90
pp 55-62

[Article by Lyubomir Vladimirov: "A Historic Step
Toward a Democratic Society"]

[Text] The Grand National Assembly elections, held in two rounds on 10 and 17 June, initiated the difficult historical process of Bulgaria's transformation into a parliamentary democracy. However one assesses the election results, one thing is beyond all doubt—the holding of the first multiparty elections in several decades divides the existence of the Bulgarian nation into two disparate periods. Before and after the elections now signify a peak moment in our country's modern history that will, we hope, be described by the categories of radical change and revolutionary reversal. In the present-day historical context, even the results themselves have lost a large part of their concrete character. Their main result is completely different if we seek their actual sociohistorical dimensions. That result boils down to the simple fact that, with the elections, the Bulgarian people regained their political existence, reestablished their image of a sovereign nation that had been desecrated by the authoritarian-totalitarian system, and thus reestablished their membership among the civilized nations of the modern world.

The elections actually have historic significance—they laid the first building block in modern Bulgaria's edifice of democratic culture; they were and will remain the first difficult step in our country's self-transformation and development into a civilized democratic society. The election results themselves also confirm the individuality and uniqueness of the Bulgarian path to democracy: not a repetition of what has been done and is being done in the other East European countries, from the GDR to Romania, but something unfamiliar that does not lend itself to evaluation by the criteria of traditional expectations. This is confirmed by both the actions and the conduct of the political actors and forces participating in the event that also evoked amazement and incomprehension among outside observers. The party that won the absolute majority in the new parliament proposed a coalition government, but the losing political force categorically refused to assume the responsibility of governing for which it had so persistently striven. From a political commonsense perspective, this situation is explicable only in the logic of the theater of the absurd. But the point is that such political commonsense that can function in a normal political situation and with established democratic institutions is forming in our country for the first time. The obviously "abnormal" situation is objectively due to the existing conditions—to a transition from a period of political stagnation to a time of political life. For this reason the times will belong, socially, to whoever takes into account the trends

of change that realistically exist, to whoever proceeds from his logic rather than imposing his own ideology, his own private party interests.

In situations of radical social changes, it is extremely difficult to get an objective and impartial analysis, for which analogous criteria are required. Such an analysis can be made and the necessary practical lessons drawn therefrom only by one whose standpoint is the standpoint of change, only by one for whom change itself is his viewpoint for analysis and action. It is toward precisely a radical social situation of this kind that the innovative Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is oriented. With the realization of its honest striving for civil peace and free expression of civil conscience, with its decisive rejection of the confrontational logic of antagonistic struggle and its affirmation of the constructive logic of the historically necessary consistent but all-embracing social changes, with its categorical condemnation of the past and its efforts to punish the culprits and purge the party and its administrative agencies of corrupt and tainted persons, the radicalized BSP will doubtless be the necessary active force for the democratic perestroika of our society in the existing complex and contradictory situation of intense political polarization. With realism about change, with persistence about democratization, with honesty about progress—such are the practical historical lessons drawn from the elections, the conversion of which lessons into principles of action and norms of conduct can confirm the nationwide vote of confidence for the BSP as a genuine and unquestionable choice of its policy goal, democratic socialism.

As a first test in democracy, the elections showed the political maturity and sobermindedness of the Bulgarian people and their desire for a maximally conflict-free process of irreversible change at the lowest possible price. This very general appraisal of the preparation for, character, and results of the elections directs our attention to those not so obvious, and often even concealed social processes and operative mechanisms that, if we fail to understand, the behavior of the different political forces and of the strata and categories of the population represented by them will remain inexplicable. There is no denying the fact that there can be no comparison between the social characteristics of the epoch before and the epoch after the elections, a fact that finds expression in the dwindling away and the outgrowing of the 10th of November argument. Whereas before 10 June 1990 the event of 10 November 1989 to some extent and in some form or other defined the specific image of the society awakened to civic and political life, after 17 June the defining motif in our country's civic and political conduct became the people's self-confidence and self-esteem engendered in the elections, however gently, however timidly and contradictorily expressed. The principled and organic difference between freedom bestowed and freedom won, between sham power and real power of the people, between a directed and a self-affirming democracy is the canvas on which will be woven the multicolored palette of the

public life, whose dilemma, still not finally solved in practice, will ultimately determine the multistratal struggle of the different political forces to create effective democratic institutions.

It is only by taking into account this crucial factor, by weighing its consequences and influence on public life that it becomes possible to make an objective, impartial, and uncompromisingly critical analysis of the existing dynamic situation in postelection Bulgaria as a basis for a constructive political policy and strategy that put the whole nation's interests above everything and everybody else. For most of the BSP members and sympathizers, who by their votes contributed to the election success, the formulation of such a policy is being faced for the first time. They will support its practical implementation, and the party of socialists will gain a new and far wider vote of confidence if the policy is actually formulated in a truly democratic way as an embodiment of the freely expressed will of the Bulgarian people radicalized as a whole.

In this situation one thing is clear: Whoever stands for radicalization of the people will win, while whoever proceeds from or insists on their "conservatism" will lose. The political struggle for the people's minds and sympathies, for their engagement in the democratic process of self-change, faces us. How and why can it be won?

This question can be answered as it deserves only by a clear awareness of what has happened in recent months and of the prerequisites the elections have created for future political and social development.

The final concrete results of the elections unequivocally indicate what the Bulgarian, speaking through them, prefers for his present and future. On the one hand, it is an indisputable vote for radical change and reforms in society and, on the other, for steady democratization, but under conditions of peaceful transition and guaranteed stability. Speaking very generally, the political forces participating in the elections set the same two goals as basic in their preelection platforms, although they differed on the means and stages proposed for their achievement—in other respects, they were at variance with each other.

But no sooner did the preliminary election results emerge—namely, the significant victory of the BSP and the "unexpected" loss of the principal opposition force, as represented by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], but no less by the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]—than there arose a crisis situation with a challenge by the opposition of the elections and, ultimately, with a challenge of the conditions of the preelection and election campaign. In just 20 days after 11 June, and especially at the end of June and the beginning of July, the crisis situation over nonacceptance of the elections' legitimacy escalated into open confrontation, while the political polarization took on

the appearance of a political conflict with obvious "chip-on-the-shoulder" elements. The opposition's aim, declared before the election, of accepting the results, whatever they were, and of carrying on with politics dissipated imperceptibly into thin air. There came to the fore, under the banner of civil criticism and disobedience to authority (one-party socialist government—there was no other authority actually functioning), a phenomenon unfamiliar to our present-day civilized world: rejection of parliamentarianism, of parliamentary democracy, and of the process—parliamentary elections—which alone legitimize them. This was and continues to be a rejection in advance of the legitimacy of parliament, a denial in advance of a vote of confidence in its right to organize state power, and thus a denial as well of the system of government in general, of its legality and the rule of law. In a word, social disorder anarchy and civil war are put forward as principles and norms of sociopolitical conduct and life. Nor is this simply some "crusade" of a political adversary turned into an enemy, but a criminal killing of a newborn at the moment of its birth, immediately after it takes its first breath of air, after its first cry of life.

The question of questions is not the specific blame for the acts of disorder and civil disobedience that have been inspired and tolerated; the evil genie that escaped from the uncorked bottle is disobedient likewise to the opposition that set it free to live, and to the wholesome forces in the people defending order, security, and the stability of society. This evil genie—confrontation—was conceived much earlier, back "when the principles" of democracy "were poured into" the bottle. An objective and impartial appraisal of the overall election phenomenon in the unity of all its component elements would be impossible without an honest answer to the question: When and how did confrontation imperceptibly supplant and take the place of the rule of law and law observance? When was legitimate authority done away with in practice by illegitimate means, no matter how justly the former was challenged? And when was illegitimacy reborn as legitimacy?

The short, concrete but honest answer to the variously formulated question runs something like this: Confrontation was established as "democratic legitimacy" at the so-called Roundtable that, in addition to everything else, produced a new Election Law in accordance with which the elections on 10 and 17 June were held. The Roundtable thus gained recognition as an actual legislative body, and the official legislative body in the person of the National Assembly was in practice reduced to the role of a purely formal "legalizer" of the illegitimate institution's decisions. For this there were objective preconditions—the democratic opposition that had come into being, quite young and assertive, was not represented in the National Assembly. The persistent battle of the opposition for "special Status" of the Round Table—that is, for granting it legitimacy—culminated in victory (but the events after the elections showed that this was a Pyrrhic victory—the extraparlimentary

forms of "democratic" pressure on the Grand National Assembly, the supreme body of state power and popular sovereignty, stirred up righteous indignation among the newly elected deputies, but had they not created this precedent?). The agreements reached among the principal parties at the Roundtable had de facto force of law. Their semblance of democratic legitimacy was preserved until the elections or a little before, when the polarization of the political scene reached a high degree and clearly disclosed the fragility of the supralegal agreement that can lose its force with any change in the political interests of the opposed parties, just as happened.

As long as the Roundtable was in operation and until the National Assembly was adjourned, there came into being that phenomenon familiar to us from a multitude of revolutionary situations in the history of individual countries and peoples—dyarchy. However, the existence of one body of authority, constitutionally established, and of a second, established by political agreement—that is, extraparlamentarily—ultimately had its natural result, anarchy. Nobody advertised this, but that did not prevent its capturing the lower echelons of administration as well. This principal consequence of the "Special Status" of "the Round Table" ricocheted in the functioning of the elected Grand National Assembly and in its incapacity to make legislative decisions. The problem is not at all in the specific disposition of the "principal political forces" represented; the Grand National Assembly's "spinning of its wheels" unequivocally demonstrates the erosion of the institutions of state power that is effected with the introduction of "above-partisanship" as a principle and norm of political power. Wherein lies the reason for the powerlessness of a democratically and freely elected parliament? It lies in the fundamental extraconstitutional interchange of the functions of "the Roundtable" and the parliament: Whereas before the elections "the Roundtable" acted as an actual parliament, after the elections the parliament acted as a "Roundtable." "Above-partisanship," powerlessness, and confrontation characterize chiefly the first fortnight's proceedings of the parliament—and nobody should be "surprised" that once again the "avenue" of dictating the behavior of every agency of authority in the state is being explored.

Even the most cursory enumeration of the facts confirms the conclusion that supraconstitutional extraparlamentary political agreements are a discrepant and unstable foundation that can guarantee almost no security or real possibilities for the exercise of power functions by the competent administrative bodies concerned. Yet the SDS alone hardly deserves the accusation that it subjected to organized ostracism all the institutions and machinery of administration established through agreement by the Roundtable. Was not the very method of organizing the Roundtable, not by conversations between the government and the budding democratic opposition but as conversations between the principal political forces, a great political mistake? In this way, political responsibility for the state of the country was

assumed entirely by the remaining single governing party, while yesterday's partner, having left the government, went over to the opposition. And, quite naturally, the political struggle between the SDS and the BSP both before, during, and after the elections constantly was and is growing into a struggle for or against legitimate power, including a struggle through pressure in the streets on the Grand National Assembly, which thus failed to legitimize itself as the actual body of state power by making the decisions that were so necessary.

Is it necessary to recall extensively such facts as the refusal of the SDS and the BZNS to participate in a coalition government that, in addition to solving the immediate economic and political problems, had to organize and conduct the parliamentary elections? On what, then, does the opposition base its dissatisfaction and its charges of "dishonest" elections and manipulation and falsification of the results? Or the refusal to sign the agreement on nonviolence during the elections and afterwards? And "the blue mornings"? And, finally, the attacks on the president and the institution of the presidency on the "above-party" television? One thing is clear: The final erosion of the still-functioning or just-created state and legal structures has as its aim and result the "revolutionizing" of the sociopolitical situation, which is by no means difficult in the growing political crisis. The quest for justification in the fact that totalitarian structures have not been cleared away and that the party-schedule principle of administration has not been abolished is, rather, a glossing over of the actual problem: In what way and by what means is a peaceful transition to a democratic society to be made? The pathway to democracy must itself be democratic, and not through open confrontation and dangerous conflict, which undermine the foundations of the civil peace everybody desires. Nobody should be surprised then by the fact that, in the intensifying political polarization, the parliament has begun to replicate the extraparlamentary conflict and to be in no position to fulfill its purpose.

On the other hand, the presidential crisis that has arisen has far deeper causes than those pointed out by the opposed political forces. And it requires much more serious analyses and explanations. In the final analysis, the question reduces to the legitimacy of power and to the ability of the elected people's representatives to overcome their party prejudices and, by means of reasonable compromises, to lay the sound foundations of a democratic social structure and a rule-of-law state.

For the achievement of such a high goal it is of incontrovertible importance that the figures who have shouldered the heavy burden of political responsibilities should have political morality, given the unbuilt democratic and parliamentary machinery for the self-regulation of sociopolitical life. The personal offense of the recent president who was compelled to submit his resignation should not obscure the fact that what was accomplished in half a month of Grand National Assembly proceedings is so little. Destruction is easy, but

even destruction itself is worthwhile in the creation of something truly new and constructive. It is from the perspective of the actual possibilities for constructivism and the political reform of society that the concrete election results themselves should be interpreted. For there is quite a real danger of the presidential crisis growing into a parliamentary crisis. And then, indeed, the BSP's election victory would become a Pyrrhic one.

* * *

How does the postelection situation look from the positions of the BSP in the light of the results that were obtained?

The winning of almost 53 percent of the deputy seats (211 out of a total of 400) is an unquestionable victory for the policy, championed by the BSP, of tolerance and striving for tranquility and security. It is this policy, pitted against the policy of political pressure, confrontation, and tension, that will succeed in attracting the most votes from the undecided, which proved decisive for the final results. These votes, their switchover, led to certain—at first glance—paradoxical results: In the large cities, the BSP lost and the SDS won, while in the smaller settlements the BSP won and the BZNS lost. This statement, however, is as debatable or at least as problematic as it is widespread. Likewise as debatable is the statement that the SDS as a whole lost the election, that it suffered defeat. But how objective and reliable are these assertions?

First and foremost, it should be noted that the election loss is not a defeat for the SDS. Given the lack of organized opposition and comparatively serious opposition actions under the totalitarian regime such as there were in the other East European countries, the votes that the SDS received after barely half a year's activity are truly significant. Quite different is the matter that the number thereof differs from what was expected, from the claims, in large part unrealistic, of the opposition leaders.

As for the results in the large cities and the preferences that the voters gave to one or another platform and election tactic, matters are not clear-cut. This is obvious, for example, in comparing the results in terms of the proportional system. The allegation that the SDS won a victory in the large cities is at least inaccurate. With the exception of Sofia, where the SDS won 17 seats, the BSP seven, and the BZNS two, forces were more evenly distributed in the other large cities. In Plovdiv the SDS has eight seats, the BSP seven, the BZNS two; in Varna the SDS and the BSP each has five seats, and the BZNS has one; in Burgas the SDS and the BSP each has four seats and the BZNS one. The BSP's appreciable loss in the large cities traces to the majority system in which votes are counted for specific candidates rather than by party list. Thus in Sofia the SDS won 24 seats and the BSP only two; in Plovdiv and Varna the SDS has 10 and

eight seats, respectively, and the BSP not a single one, whereas in Burgas the SDS has three seats and the BSP two.

Also significant are the results obtained by the BZNS, which won seats only under the proportional system, and those in the main with city votes. In practice, the BZNS's gain in the cities and its loss in the countryside both have common reasons. In the slashing fight between the two political "mastodons," the undecided vote in the cities was cast for the BZNS, while the election vote in the countryside was distributed between the BSP and the Nikola Petkov BZNS, a component of the SDS. Thus, in a certain sense, the BZNS became a victim of specific political conditions, mainly the sharp confrontation between the SDS and the BSP. But still the principal reason for the BZNS's weak support in the countryside and small cities was primarily its undefined and confused political line, its vacillation in political orientation, and its contradictory agrarian policy.

Support of the BSP's policy and platform for peaceful and guaranteed transition to a democratic social order is obvious also from the election results in most of the medium-large cities in the country. In a number of them the SDS won only one seat under the proportional system, whereas the BSP won three each in Yambol, Smolyan, and Vidin, respectively, and four each in the cities of Tolbukhin, Mikhaylovgrad, and Shumen (with one seat for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]). The situation is more unusual in the rayons, where the SDS did not gain a single seat, but the votes were distributed between the BSP and the DPS: in Turgovishte and Silistra, one and three seats each, respectively; in Razgrad two each; and in Kurdzhali alone, one and five seats, respectively. Obvious here is the role of voters with a Turkish self-identity. The general uniformity of the distribution of seats in these four rayons indicates that the BSP succeeded in neutralizing SDS influence but could not overcome the barrier of the onerous heritage of serious Bulgarian Communist Party errors on the national question in the immediate past. With the exception of the Gabrovo electoral rayon, where it won one seat as against two for the SDS and one for the BZNS, the BSP convinced the electorate of its honest intentions to actually bring the country up to date and indeed to do it.

These data on the election results under the proportional system require thoroughgoing analysis, above all from the viewpoint of BSP mass support and social base. It is regrettable that the BSP Supreme Council still has not made this analysis and has not subjected it to public discussion and to a critical balance sheet with all party members and sympathizers. However, in view of the situation and the impending elections for local governmental bodies, the balance sheet will be of decisive importance for formulation of a correct strategic line and specific tactics of the political struggle.

To be sure, the analysis of the election results will be incomplete without strict consideration of the seats won

under the majority system in which individuals competed. Here the BSP won 114 seats as against the SDS's 69, the 14 of the DPS, and six others. These figures speak eloquently for themselves, but these results now require concrete and meticulous analysis in order to draw the necessary generalizations and lessons for the entire pre-election campaign and for future BSP parliamentary activity, but chiefly for the necessary updating of the BSP and its transformation into a consistently democratic leftist Marxist party, with a new organizational structure, new methods of mass and individual political work, and a new ideological orientation that will meet the existing and rapidly changing realities. This analysis cannot be the subject of one article; no more so of one session alone of the Grand National Assembly or of the obshchina councils. It has to be made in the whole party—both at the center and locally; it has to enlist both specialists and rank-and-file members. The partywide discussion that has begun will doubtless make a contribution of its own to this sine qua non for the future work and policy of the BSP and the decisive and consistent elaboration and implementation of a new party course and strategy under conditions of the developing parliamentary democracy.

But certain tentative conclusions, generalizations, and lessons can be drawn here and now. What are they?

The first conclusion has to do with the overall election results. The BSP obviously won a large vote of confidence, but, as has often been asserted in the analyses that have been made, this confidence represents a credit, an advance, an expectation of faithful implementation of the pre-election platform, and, of course, actual self-change. This confidence is based on realistic practical actions that have brought our country to the realities of political pluralism and a multiparty system, to the approaches to establishment of a rule-of-law state. Even though not its alone, the BSP's credit is nonetheless considerable for the political dynamism and reform in the country; in just seven months, the nation's free political development has traveled a course that other nations under much more favorable social, economic, and cultural conditions have traveled or are traveling in years or decades. This has also resulted in the existing acute political polarization.

Bound up with this polarization is the next conclusion: The BSP must learn to work in a regime of political pluralism and parliamentary democracy. A large part of its key personnel, inherited from the communist past, does not know how to work and operate under conditions of political competition and campaigning, under conditions of active political life that is especially touchy during a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Although, as a governing party, it successfully coped with the difficult task of organizing and conducting honest, free, and democratic elections for the first time in four decades, the conduct of the party as a whole during the pre-election campaign was very seriously censurable. Both the central and the local leaderships failed to impose their political resolve for a tolerant

political campaign and, in a number of cases, either found themselves in a position of constant defense or else unwarrantably yielded to the opposition's political provocations. This, unquestionably, is not an ability that comes into being all of a sudden as with a magic wand but should be persistently cultivated. But it was precisely this cultivation that was absent in the election campaign itself, although this was exactly the social milieu for first organizing and developing it, as well as for checking on what was really achieved. Objective causes unquestionably were in operation—the breakup of the previously existing organizational structure, the vacillation of a number of key and party-schedule personnel—especially locally, as well as the essentially frozen intraparty life and discussions. To the latter, special attention should be turned if the party wants to solidify the election results in its impending difficult parliamentary and political activity at all.

Bound up with this situation is the third principal conclusion: What is needed is genuinely serious self-criticism of the party, a decisive break with the ugly past, consistently and exhaustively. This was not brought to the level of self-criticism before the elections, for which reason people who, due to their ties to the previous regime were not entirely deserving of confidence, got onto the party lists, or else radicals and reformers dropped off them. In our situation, that nobody sits in judgment on the victors is not valid; quite the contrary, the party both as a whole and as personal leadership must sit in self-judgment lest its adversaries do it, as is indeed happening.

Fourth, there is the serious problem of how to carry out economic reform under the new political conditions. The preservation of the people's confidence will depend to the greatest extent on doing this successfully.

Fifth, its participation in the formulation of the new Constitution, in which the working people's interests will be protected and legislatively guaranteed, will be decisive. And this, in the main, will be done by establishing a constitutional order that will assure economic prosperity, national consensus, and an effective solution of such crucial problems as the ecology, for example. For the work of the party in the formulation of the new pillars of the state to have a good outcome, however, a new strategy and tactic of its relationships with the other political forces and social movements is needed. This probably will be the most difficult terrain to work—antagonism and a confrontational attitude in the opposition are a very serious barrier that must be overcome in all situations. Flexibility in relation toward different elements in the opposition, especially toward those constituting the SDS parties and movements; reasonable compromises without retreat in strategic areas; tactical maturity and the ability to extract political dividends out of real concrete successes; honest acknowledgement of errors or shortsighted behavior, against which no innovative party is insured—this is the repertory of political knowledgeability that the party must master without fail if it truly desires to survive intact as a leftist democratic

party defending the working people's interests. Schooling in all this can be gained in activity both inside and outside parliament, but this is contingent and depends in maximal measure on the character and the level of self-change and radical innovation of the Socialist Party itself.

The final requirement synthesizes all the conclusions and generalizations: organized, ideological, personnel, functional innovation—this is the key to the Socialist Party's future. The dilemma over what character it should have—parliamentary or mass party—to a great extent is spurious and the fruit of borrowing from foreign experience untested in our concrete national conditions. Partywide discussion must yield a satisfactory answer to this question, otherwise the party will be doomed to permanent discussions and very likely will be faced with the danger of splitting. Any compromise with its ideological distinctiveness—the party's basing itself on Marxist doctrine but being capable of developing it, as well as mastering, conformably, with its own political interests and concrete circumstances and goals, the ideas and formulations of other ideological schools—will hardly be successful. Without sketchiness and dogmatism, without sectarianism and reclusion, but by actions on a wide front and by weighing the different interests of the different strata of the people, it can gain recognition as an actually strong party with decisive influence on social and political life.

Karl Marx once said that it is not enough to reach the truth; it is also necessary that the path to the truth itself be true. If we paraphrase his thought, we might now say that it is not enough for the BSP to gain recognition as a leftist democratic party; the path to the democratic system must also be democratic. Let us together search for the truest democratic path.

Financing of Former Communist Youth Group Questioned

Accounts Detailed

91BA0061A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 9 Oct 90
p 15

[Article by Dimitur Dinev: "Always Loyal to Themselves; The Youth *Nomenklatura* Kept Its Chunk of Bread at the Expense of the Rest of Us"]

[Text] It was in May 1987 that, for the last time, the trumpets of the 15th DKMS [Dimitrov Communist Youth Union] solemnly blared. Once more we had the opportunity to see the trappings with which we were fed up to the teeth: Reports, promises, and elections, and look at the enthusiastic faces of not-so-young people, shining activists in the youth organization, called upon to struggle for the good of...perhaps their own good alone.

For decades this "cadre forge" (read careerists), which the DKMS was known to be, created individuals such as the notorious Encho Moskov, who will be noted in

history for the 12,000 bottles of whiskey he drank in the company of friends; Stanka Shopova, who sank millions in the collapsed Youth Republic in Strandzha-Sakar; and Andrey Vundzhulov, who was too much in a hurry to have his record entered in the *Guinness Book of World Records*.... There were many unique professional Komsomol secretaries, whose greatest concern was to be the first to register as members of all delegations and tourist groups. There were degenerates, such as one active fighting offspring in Belitsa who declared, with frank cynicism, that in 10 years he will be driving nothing but a black "Volga" (which he does!).

Every year the state generously drowned these unhealthy ambitions in subsidies in the range of 30, 40, or more million leva, which should have been used for the upbringing of young people in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism—that is, a spirit of obedience and agreement with everything the only and wise party ordered.

Also concerned with investing such funds were the people of the Orbita BMT, whose present director is famous as sponsor of international foreign exchange speculators, and the Republic Council of the TNTM [Movement for Youth Technical and Scientific Creativity], the Republic Brigade Staff, the Avangard Society, and so forth.

The activities of the Orbita BMT are qualified as profitable because it is subsidized by the state through the foreign exchange coefficient; 25 percent of the funds for the TNTM come out of the Republic's budget, whereas the rest comes from 3 percent withholdings from the investment funds of enterprises, ministries, departments, and economic organizations. Let us now see how the TNTM assets have been used over the past three or four years. This is our, the people's, money.

It was established as early as 1987 that the previous and present heads of the Financial-Economic Department of the DKMS Central Committee gave illegally, as subsidies to municipalities, close to 1.5 million leva. The attempt to impose a property sanction on them was so weak that, after a brief, energetic resistance, both men came out intact. An investigation made clear that the bread they took out of our mouths went to pay for cocktails, press conferences, souvenirs such as umbrellas and ties, and assignments abroad. The most interesting expenditure was for the "Expo-91" bulletin, an event that was doomed not to happen. Nonetheless, as industrious people with foresight, the Komsomol leaders drafted and paid \$22,400 for the printing of the bulletin. Who knows how much more was wasted in assignments to Yugoslavia, where the service was performed. All we have now is this luxurious thoughtlessness, carrying the portrait of Todor Zhivkov on page 2 and his greetings to the participants....

What is strange is that the improper use of the assets of the TNTM Fund is frequently linked in auditing documents to the names of Konstantin Vladov and Vasil

Velev. The latter, instead of being held answerable, is now director of the Eureka Foundation and is prospering, hiding behind the back of Rosen Karadimova, the independent deputy.

One should be envious of the manner in which the heirs of the DKMS finished weaving their old basket and are now redecorating it with new names.

As early as last year, a substantial amount of money was transferred from the TNTM Fund as statutory capital of various big and small companies. Another clever financial operation was carried out: Over the head of the minister of finance, 55 million leva were transferred to the Mineralbank: 10 million as share capital; 40 million as an investment earning 5 percent annual interest; and 5 million for youth innovations, which disappeared without a trace, although Council of Ministers Letter No. 61 specifically indicates that budget funds must be kept separate and expended for strictly defined purposes!

Biser Slavkov, chief of the State Financial-Tax Control Main Administration, submitted a report to the minister of finance and suggested that the funds deposited in Mineralbank be transferred to the state budget as unused funds coming from the national economy—in turn, the amount of 3,299,000 leva to be collected from different Komsomol companies, among which it had been distributed only for the sake of remaining in the possession of the members of the apparat.

After pretending deafness for quite some time, the DKMS donned a democratic suit, and its new leadership is actively eliminating the traces of its old shady deals—its best strike as the registration of the Eureka Foundation, which incredibly complicated the question of who is the owner of the assets of the former TNTM Fund and where are they to be found. While we are waiting, the Ministry of Finance, which is the ultimate authority, is to determine to whom those millions belong; they are no longer to be found in Mineralbank, either. The Komsomol *nomenklatura* was able to retain its cozy positions and benefits with the help of more than 80 companies that produce nothing and are totally unnecessary. Meanwhile, let the idiots stand in line with their bowls for free soup on Lenin Square, and let them try to sell their minds and hands on the labor exchange.

[Editorial note by Vanya Shekeroval The editors have a certain number of documents in support of everything said above. Nonetheless, we deemed it our duty to read the auditing documents No. 370104 of November 1987 and 9019 of 23 July 1990, which were mentioned by the author of this article.

The first of these documents was given to me somewhat reluctantly by the Central Auditing Committee of the BDM [Bulgarian Democratic Youth], where I was also told that the second document does not exist. Nonetheless, I decided to try. Lyudmil Georgiev, deputy director of the Sofia State Financial-Tax Control Administration, agreed to meet with me. Inspector Milcho Genov confirmed the existence of said auditing document but

hinted that I should first read the material prepared for publication. He then suddenly decided that the document could not be viewed by outsiders without the agreement of the director.

“Comrade” Director Kiril Yanev categorically refused to let me see this audit document. Because in the case what mattered was to get his “yes” or “no,” I wanted neither to listen to explanations nor to quote them. According to the accepted practice, it will very likely become necessary for such explanations to be submitted in writing to the editors after the publication of this material.

However, when I tried to mention this to Inspector Genov, he reacted to my words as though it was an unheard-of threat. From an insignificant little animal, he all of a sudden turned into a tiger and almost tore me apart in his rage. Let us hope that this did not affect his health because this little man is no longer in his prime. Furthermore, there is a great deal of strenuous work that awaits him because, in our unfortunate country, many are the overdue debts....

Real Estate, Hard Currency

91BA0061B Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 9 Oct 90
p 15

[Article by Petur Grigorov: “The Elder Brothers Took Away Their Dolls and Gave Them Rags To Play With”]

[Text]

Dear Editors:

Thanks to the journalists Mariya Mikhaylova and Nikolay Lalkovski, and, above all, thanks to your newspaper, I have dared to raise once again a question that has bothered me for several years.

In issue No. 20 of 1990, your newspaper published the article “A One-Party Man Is a Friend Indeed.” In this article, in addition to other “deals,” the case of the kindergarten on Chervena Iskra Street in the Knyazhevo District is mentioned.

With your help, we would like to find the answers to several questions:

Subsequent to the nationalization of this huge house after 9 September 1944, it became state property. By what right, therefore, has the DKMS [Dimitrov Communist Youth Union] (BDM) sold it to a foreign citizen for a large amount of foreign currency? The talk is that it was sold for \$350,000.

The DKMS (BDM) should tell us where this currency went.

Why was the building not transferred to the Vitosha Municipal People’s Council to be used as housing for extremely needy people?

I appeal to the A House for Everyone Movement and to any other interested person to become involved.

This applies to the prosecutor's office as well!

Let us go back. The kindergarten was not for normal but for logopedic children. Someone instructed that the children be moved to the city, to breathe its "clean" air, while the DKMS Central Committee Scientific Research Institute took over the building in Knyazhevo, hidden from the eyes of outsiders.

As I commented on this case with my rayon neighbors, everyone was indignant because we had to take our children to remote kindergartens (in the Gorna Banya District). We were ready to submit a petition by the families who wanted to take their children closer to their homes. The answer of the petition to the Sofia People's Council (1987) was that the number of children was not large enough and that, furthermore, considering the distance from 9 Septemvri Boulevard (300-400 meters), transportation was difficult. It has been difficult for more than 20 years. Meanwhile, the personnel of the institute regularly received tanker trucks with fuel so that the Central Committee scientific workers can be warm.

HUNGARY

Italian Investor Eyes TV Channel, Stores

91CH0154A Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Nov 90
p 18

[Article by Laszlo Liskai: "Hungarian Television Between Restructuring and Privatization"]

[Text] Budapest—Mr. Silvio Berlusconi is getting ready to put together \$60 million to launch a commercial TV channel in Hungary. That is four times what would ordinarily be thought necessary in Hungary for such a venture. The Fininvest company, working in partnership with Credit Bank of Hungary and probably the MAFILM film production company as well (see LE MONDE of 8 November), does not want to be the majority stockholder in the future Hungarian private television station.

The envoy of "sua Emittenza," during a visit to Budapest over the last few days, said it would be "desirable" to sell 15 percent of the shares to private individuals. Mr. Berlusconi's group, one of whose mainstays is the Standa chain of stores in Italy, also wants to buy Hungary's state-owned chain of Centrum stores.

But Mr. Silvio Berlusconi is not alone: Mr. Robert Maxwell wants a station, and U.S. and Japanese interests have expressed interest in buying shares in one of Hungary's television channels. Hungary has two state-owned television channels, plus a third channel that was used by the Soviet Army. It is probably the third channel that will be put up for sale. Mr. Berlusconi's representative, who this time around paid a call on the Defense

Ministry, indicated his station would "complement" rather than compete with the two public channels.

Mr. Hankiss, the man responsible for the channels, is soon going to present his program to restructure the editorial departments as production offices and thin out personnel ranks that had swollen during the "years of waste." Mr. Hankiss also intends to name two independent directors not linked to either of the main political parties (Democratic Forum and Alliance of Free Democrats) to head the two public stations, promising them total autonomy. He categorically rejects the idea several politicians have espoused of allowing the two big parties to name the station directors.

Constitutional Court: Institution, Authority Challenged

Court Performs Legislative Function

91CH0198A Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY
in Hungarian 31 Oct 90 p 2178

[Dissenting opinion of Constitutional Court Justice Dr. Peter Schmidt regarding the abolition of the death penalty]

[Text] The provisions of Paragraphs 8 and 54 of the Constitution presently in force are contradictory. Paragraph 54, Section (1) prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life, and thereby does not rule out the possibility of the death penalty. Paragraph 8, Section (2) was created separately, at a later date. It prohibits limitation of the substantive content of fundamental rights, even by way of laws.

Although the interpretation of the Constitution is within the authority of the Constitutional Court, the resolution of conflicting constitutional provisions is the right and duty of the National Assembly, which holds the power to frame the Constitution. This authority cannot be assumed by the Constitutional Court.

For this reason it is my view that the Constitutional Court should declare the desire for jurisdiction, and should remind the National Assembly of the need to eliminate the contradiction. All this would not rule out a possibility for the Constitutional Court to enumerate all arguments which speak against the death penalty.

'Reminiscent of Party State'

91CH0198B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 3 Nov 90 p 89

[Article by Endre Babus: "Abolition of the Death Penalty; Salto Mortale"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] "The method by which the abolition of the death penalty took place is reminiscent of the days of the party state. Once again they made an important decision 'above the head' of society," according to a Budapest law professor, Csaba Kabodi, himself a member of the League Against the Death

Penalty (Habel). The criminal law expert is one of those who believes that the gallows should have been eliminated from the Hungarian legal system only after detailed parliamentary debate. "It would have been appropriate to clearly and unequivocally inform the public whether this decision was reached because Hungary wanted to join the Council of Europe, and the European Charter of Human Rights was to be signed on 8 November," Kabodi states. [passage omitted]

Court Should Be Abolished

91CH0198C Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 23 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Dr. Jozsef Korosi: "Parliament Cannot Create an Unconstitutional Law; Is the Constitutional Court Superfluous?"]

[Text] Constitutional problems that arose in the course of debate over an advance opinion rendered by the Constitutional Court concerning the legislative proposal related to the land law prompted me to conduct professional research. I might add that this debate concerns the role and place of the Constitutional Court.

I will state in advance that the purpose of this writing is to achieve professional objectivity, rather than to cause a disturbance in public life or to argue in support of one or the other partisan interest. To dispel the latter assumption, I will state that I am not a member of any party. This article constitutes a statement by an old professional concerned about the nation. It is based on facts, even if those facts are disillusioning.

It would be self-deceiving to suggest that adjustments ought to be made regarding the Constitutional Court, based on experience gained from its brief functioning thus far. To start out with what will be the conclusion of this examination: the Constitutional Court has no roots in Hungarian constitutional law. It never had any roots. Establishing the Constitutional Court was a big mistake. The law which provided for the establishment of the Constitutional Court should be repealed, and the administrative law court should be restored simultaneously.

Today's Constitutional Court is a typical example of adopting institutions from other countries which have no roots in the history of our peculiar Hungarian constitutional law. This is so, because not a single foreign or Hungarian expert on constitutional law will dispute the fact that at the highest level, the parliament represents popular sovereignty. Within that institution, elected representatives stand in the place of voters in the course of exercising popular sovereignty.

No person or organ could stand above this institution!

Our parliament frames laws. No legal provision is above, or has more force than such laws. Therefore it follows by logic that parliament cannot create a law that violates the constitution! To believe the opposite is nonsense. To start out from the premise that the parliament is capable

of creating an unconstitutional law is absurd from the outset! The conclusion I drew follows from the essence of these matters.

The organization of parliament includes specialized committees, and also a committee on constitutional law, which may include representatives holding law degrees. In addition, in the course of examining the legality of legislative proposals, this committee may utilize experts possessing an equal or an even higher level of professional competence than the justices of the Constitutional Court. This committee also made its own examination of the legislative proposal in advance, i.e., a parallel exists. It then follows that only a violation of a law that occurred in the course of implementing a law may become the subject of judicial review, and not the law itself.

The facts presented thus far should make it clear that only an administrative law court would be able to provide judicial relief from the effects of illegal provisions contained in laws, decrees, and ordinances promulgated by the central or local governments, or in determinations made by tax authorities of the second instance, etc.

It then follows that the parallel functioning of a constitutional court and an administrative law court would be superfluous and expensive. It would spread thin the already limited capacity of the judiciary, and parallel operations may become the source of bureaucracy. (As an example I will mention the fact that for the past nine months, the Constitutional Court was incapable of taking action in response to a related petition of mine in which I complain about a law having been violated. Part of the reason for this incapacity may be the fact that in my case, just as in the legislative proposal concerning the land law, the Constitutional Court would have to deal with theoretical issues.)

Perhaps the lack of confidence based on historical experience played a role at the time the legislature made the mistake of establishing a Constitutional Court. In any event, the result is that the establishment of the Constitutional Court was accompanied by a self-imposed limitation in the ability to govern.

Television viewers must have had an odd feeling when the justices of the Constitutional Court, dressed in their cloaks, pronounced a virtual judgment of the court regarding the draft land law. The possibility of the Court pronouncing a death sentence relative to a criminal act which had not been committed, occurred to me suddenly. One may also feel that this judicial organ may remove the responsibility of making decisions from the shoulders of future cabinets. What would it take before a cabinet having doubts about one matter or another turns to the Constitutional Court for an answer? To carry this argument to the extreme, the Constitutional Court could pronounce judgment over the cabinet, moreover, conceivably that Constitutional Court could turn into an arena for political struggle.

In conclusion, I remind the reader that both the Soviet Union and the Western powers regard as a model, the Hungarian reform process that began in 1968, and the present systems change. Numerous professional opinions share the common characteristic of viewing adaptation consistent with our peculiar Hungarian conditions and our historical development as appropriate, rather than the adoption of certain institutions from more developed countries. Our constitutional statehood, and our evolving democracy will not tolerate self-constraining obstacles filled with contradictions, like the Constitutional Court appears to be. Such institutions have their origin in fear experienced in the past. They may render the workings of parliament uncertain. Simply put, we could say that the parliament, the highest organ of popular sovereignty, became indirectly dependent on a few judges of a court.

I recall the 1950's with a sense of nostalgia. At that time, our Administrative Law Court was changed into a Financial Arbitration Board. The Osvath Council of that board voided decisions made by authorities of the second instance based on illegal decrees promulgated by ministries. Simultaneously with this action, we presented a properly reasoned request to the appropriate ministry to change the decree which violated the law.

The government of those days did not tolerate such action. With a single stroke of the pen, and in violation of the laws, it abolished the last remnant of the Administrative Law Court. Actually, this action marked the beginning of an era of illegality which permeated the entire state administration.

By now the Cabinet feels the need for the establishment of administrative law courts, or more accurately, for the restoration of administrative adjudication. With this recognition, an opportunity arises to eliminate the mistakes made by establishing the Constitutional Court.

Constitutional Court: Judge Responds to Challenge

*91CH0202A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 28 Nov 90 p 5*

[Article by Professor and Constitutional Court Judge Dr. Janos Zlinszky: "The Constitutional Court Is Supposed To Restrict Arbitrary Action by the Majority"]

[Text] Is the Constitutional Court superfluous? Could not the parliament frame a law in violation of the Constitution? A "statement by an old professional concerned about the nation...based on facts" prompted me, also a professional, to raise these two questions. Based on appearances one could not say that I am totally disinterested in answering these questions, nevertheless I believe that in responding to Judge Dr. Jozsef Korosi's article published in the Friday, 23 November issue of *MAGYAR NEMZET* I am also guided by an avocation for law. The article raises two fundamental theses against the Constitutional Court. First: The Constitutional Court is inconsistent with the historical traditions of

Hungarian constitutionality. Second: The Constitutional Court cannot be reconciled in principle with a kind of popular sovereignty in which all power is placed in the hands of elected representatives.

The first thesis is more a matter of mood. It is possible that certain things have traditions in Hungary, which nevertheless do not fulfill their purposes in changing times, while other things may be useful in a modern world, things which do not have their roots in Hungarian political institutions. Incidentally, the form in which constitutional adjudication is instituted in Hungary has no historical roots. The principle that the constitutionality of legislation is subject to judicial review has historical roots in the Anglo-Saxon world, and yet, there is no real constitutional adjudication in countries where the Anglo-Saxon legal order prevails. Judicial review is provided either by the ordinary courts (in the United States, Canada), or the upper house provides judicial review by exercising judicial authority (England, Scotland). Accordingly, the German, Austrian, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Belgian, Turkish, and Portuguese constitutional courts do not have any historical roots either; a common, identical necessity brought them into being, just as in Hungary.

Despite this fact I will note that in contrast to the above enumerated countries which also provide constitutional adjudication, constitutional adjudication has far-reaching historical roots in Hungary. Constitutional adjudication in the past may be seen in the opportunity of exercising judicial authority as well as citizen rights in taking action and seeking recourse against laws, royal decrees, and central actions repugnant to Hungary's legal order. These roots may include the judicial authority exercised by the palatine of Hungary in controversies between the king and the country; the right of counties to refuse the proclamation of unconstitutional laws, and the counties' right to speak up regarding illegal actions taken by central authorities—a right not limited only to matters involving the counties; and, finally, we may include here a closing provision of the Golden Bull, which pertains to resistance. This provision holds that noblemen may individually or jointly resist without committing an act of infidelity, if the king violates the fundamental law.

I am well aware of the fact that examples taken from the constitutional order of feudal Hungary cannot be applied on a one-on-one basis today. In any event, the fact is that while in most European countries people believed in the supreme legislative power of the ruler who governed "by the grace of God," in Hungary legislation constituted a joint function of the nation and the king.

The fact is that judicial control over legislation was left out of the legal order of civil Hungary; this was consistent with the positivist trend in the field of law which had its beginnings toward the end of the 19th Century and prevailed until the middle of the present century. Positivists professed the same idea as my respected elder colleague does: All sovereignty and the legislative power

belongs to the people. Whatever this power creates through its representatives constitutes the law, consequently an illegal law is conceptually absurd!

This theory, however, failed to consider the fact that by virtue of its essence, laws are not commands issued by the power, but constitute limitations on power instead. Absolute power does not require legal order, it will prevail without it. The truth of such power may be found at the tip of bayonets, in the majority will.

My respected colleague is older than I am, and thus, quite obviously, he will have a better ability to recall laws governing Jews. These were approved by parliamentary majorities in Hungary, as well as in neighboring countries. Could my colleague seriously state that these laws were constitutional, that they were legitimate, and that arguing about these laws from a legal standpoint is "nonsense," "absurd from the outset"? Or, let us take for instance the laws passed by the first National Assembly after 1945, which declared guilty and deprived of property without indemnification entire social strata, legislating discriminatory measures purely on the basis of wealth based on the vote of a significant majority. Were these measures legitimate and constitutional because a majority approved them? And what criteria would my colleague establish to determine the legitimacy and constitutionality of popular representation itself? Would he do so based on statements of holding power which constitute self-recognition? Obviously, none other than compliance with constitutional order provides legitimacy to popular representation.

Now that the errors of the positivist approach to law, of the fetish of laws became apparent, it has become generally recognized that there exist rights which are to be secured by way of the social order, which are innate in people, and to which minorities are also entitled. Recognition of these rights constitutes more of a professional issue than an issue of majorities, just as is the case regarding factual truth, which constitutes truth not as a result of the number of people professing it to be the truth. In viewing the Constitutional Court, my respected colleague perceived a situation in which a court pronounced judgment regarding a criminal act which was not committed. Unfortunately, there are examples for situations like this. But is it not true that there are examples for situations in which a majority condemned an innocent person? In which public furor demanded innocent victims? Could it be that only judges can err? Could it be that a majority in the parliament, an unequivocal manifestation by a mass of people is infallible?

Constitutional courts are designed to restrict and correct arbitrary action taken by the majority, the illegal actions which may be taken by government. The Constitutional Court provides this corrective function to illegal laws, not on a scientific basis, and not even exclusively on a professional basis. It performs this function based on an authorization contained in the Constitution. In Hungary this authority is based on the election of a two-thirds

majority of the popular representative body. Constitutional courts functioned and gained prestige in many countries for many decades even in the absence of being sanctioned by an election. They function and gain prestige on a professional basis and based on legal principles, just as the European Court on Human Rights functions and gains prestige, based on a similar legal principle.

Decades of improper practice in numerous European countries rendered the parliament and laws as tools of those who held power. Courts, and a significant number of lawyers became accustomed to the positivist approach to law, to following directives contained in legal provisions promulgated at the lowest possible level. They viewed constitutions which declared basic rights only as political declarations bearing no influence on the administration of justice. This outlook cannot be changed all at once anywhere, including in Hungary as a result of an intent to establish constitutional statehood. Decades-old reflexes, the upbringing of entire generations cannot be erased overnight. This recognition prompted the new European systems to establish constitutional courts—specialized bodies of jurists selected in the spirit of international agreements to protect human rights—after framing their respective constitutions. The constitutional courts were also authorized to control the legislatures themselves by way of evolving law and legal order, so as to protect the individual and the minorities.

This is so, because an understanding that popular sovereignty is capable of framing any kind of law without violating laws is erroneous.

The role played by the Constitutional Court is different from that of courts which render decisions regarding disputes between individuals, it is different from the role played by an administrative law court which settles disputes between the individual and those who administer laws, and it is different from the function of the criminal court judge who adjudicates offenses against the social order committed by an individual. The role of the Constitutional Court is different, but not less important. We trust that the Hungarian Constitutional Court will be able to face this task as soon as possible, without entering into conflicts with other courts, with the popular representative body, or with the public. Nevertheless it is possible that the Constitutional Court must also deal with an unpopular situation like this in order to protect human and constitutional rights.

Legislative Draft Related to Police Completed

*91CH0199A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 27 Nov 90 p 3*

[Hungarian Telegraph Agency (MTI) report: "Legislative Proposal Complete; Guarantees the Security of Both the Citizenry and the Police"]

[Text] Considering present crime statistics, the strengthening of police constitutes a key issue from the standpoint of society. This purpose is served by a legislative proposal designed to govern the police. It was completed

a few days ago. Its provisions are consistent with European standards. Once enacted into law, the provisions are suitable to guarantee the absolute security of both the citizenry and of the police, Interior Minister Balazs Horvath told a press conference on Monday. He added that this was the first legislative proposal designed for long-term use, one that reflects the future image of the Interior Ministry.

The framers of the draft experienced many difficulties, the Minister said. Most difficulties had their roots in present-day concerns, notably the fact that insofar as the size of its police personnel is concerned, Hungary ranks fourth from the bottom among European countries, and that people react adversely to even the most legitimate action taken by police, which creates tensions. Signs of corruption which may be detected even within the police create grave concerns. The Interior Ministry takes the most stringent steps against corruption, and this will continue to be the case also in the future, Horvath said. On the day of the press conference 11 policemen were dismissed for conduct unbecoming a police officer. Nevertheless in addition to the legal background, appropriate financial conditions must be established in order to enable the police to perform its work more effectively.

The legislative draft deals with fundamental issues related to police work. It also concentrates on local government relations. Local governmental bodies will play a significant role in selecting the police chief, for example. The possibility of clearly identify the person who issued an order is an important element of the draft. The draft deals with issues involving identification processes and constrained action taken by police in the same manner as such provisions evolved in civil democracies, and provides for the legality of networks of informers and rules for the management of data by police.

A unique feature of the draft is that it assigns a virtual asylum character to universities, churches, and houses of prayer. These institutions enjoy protection. A policeman taking action regarding some matter could enter such institutions only after complying with certain stringent requirements. Nowhere else in the world is such protection provided.

The proposal is expected to be presented to the National Assembly prior to February, 1991, following societal debate.

Local Government Representatives Dissatisfied With Law

*91CH0199E Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 27 Nov 90 p 3*

[Article by (dobszay): "The Legislative Proposal Radiates a Lack of Confidence in Local Government"; Reconciliation of Interests at the Ministry of the Interior"]

[Text] The preliminary condition for the operation of autonomous local governmental bodies is that legislation

pertaining to individual areas of detail be enacted pursuant to the framework established earlier, according to administrative State Secretary Imre Verebelyi at an Interior Ministry conference held yesterday. Last week, the various specialized ministries discussed the legislative draft which provides directions concerning certain issues related to local government. The draft was completed recently. Following cabinet consultation, the interest reconciliation council was supposed to discuss the contents of the 500 page document on Monday. At this time, delegates from local government interest groups, and employee interests represented by the previous councils' professional and trade unions were seated on one side of the table. On the opposite side, the administrative state secretaries of the Office of the Prime Minister and of the various ministries listened to comments.

The agenda included debate over the following three laws: legislation to determine the functions and jurisdiction of local autonomous governing bodies, issues pertaining to assets and property owned by local governmental bodies, and the legislative proposal pertaining to the capital city. As it turned out at the beginning of the meeting, those present had no time to consult with the organizations they represented because several of them received the proposed texts only on Thursday or Friday. Accordingly, everyone was supposed to produce a reconciled opinion regarding the voluminous legal material over the weekend. All of this served to incite passions.

On behalf of the consultative organization of the various administrative districts of the capital, and of cities exercising the authority of counties, Istvan Siklaky read a statement concerning the principles of distributing local government property and public property. Thereafter, he stated that his organization did not intend to take part in a debate over the proposal developed by the specialized ministries. He subsequently added a verbal explanation to his declaration. They were concerned that even after a formal exchange of views, the cabinet would state that it submitted a plan to the National Assembly that had been reconciled with the various interests, whereas a situation like this did not exist at a time when the cabinet did not allow time for substantive debate.

Verebelyi felt that a sense of urgency existed regarding the local government law, and that negotiations should be conducted even if many participants lacked authorization from their respective organizations. Concerns may be dispelled if the cabinet did not state that it submitted to representatives a proposal that was approved by interest groups, but instead mentioned consultation, the hearing of views only. Various professional interests, and considerations of protecting certain interests that were left out, could be enforced by way of amendments in the course of committee debate. The state secretary justified the shortage of time by saying that time had to be allowed for various interest groups to establish themselves, and for the cabinet to recognize competent negotiating partners. The representative of

the National Association of Autonomous Local Governing Bodies in Settlements [TOOSZ] regarded the state secretary's reasoning as unacceptable. He claimed that his organization had indicated to the cabinet on 30 May that it was prepared to delegate competent professionals and persons to protect the interests of the governmental organs which prepared the laws. The brevity of time constitutes a valid argument, but only the cabinet should be held responsible for the brevity of time, according to the TOOSZ representative.

Attila Szarvas spoke on behalf of the Alliance for the Protection of the Interests of Small City Autonomous Local Governmental Bodies. He proposed that at this time they hold a general debate, and that details be dealt with at another time. In general, however, participants felt that the legislative proposal radiated lack of confidence in autonomous local governing bodies. Statements to this effect related primarily to provisions incorporated by the various specialized ministries, because wherever it was possible, the ministries intended to maintain relations only with organizations under their own respective jurisdictions. At the same time, in many instances the ministries intended to transfer their specialized tasks with a mandatory effect to local autonomous governing bodies.

In the course of several hours of debate, those present also discussed in detail those observations regarding individual paragraphs. After comparing views, the government will discuss once again the draft law concerning local government. It will submit the same to the parliament by 3 December at the latest. The negotiating parties agreed that interest reconciliation talks will continue at a later date.

MDF Board: Courts Pozsgay, Divided on Internal Party Issues

91CH0199C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Lajos Pogonyi: "Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) Board Meets; Party Leadership Divided on Several Issues"]

[Text] The National Board of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] held an all-day closed session on Saturday. It adopted a statement on the occasion of Imre Pozsgay's leaving the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. The statement praises Pozsgay's merits. Participants at the meeting engaged in great debate over the amendment of the party's bylaws.

Preparing itself for the Fourth National Meeting of the MDF, the National Board adopted a position regarding Pozsgay after short debate. The meeting took place at the MDF's Bem Square headquarters. The statement reads as follows:

"At its 17 November meeting, the MDF National Board dealt with Imre Pozsgay's leaving the MSZP. This news is the subject of interest and commentary throughout the

country. Pozsgay made the introductory presentation at the Lakitelek meeting where the MDF unfurled its banner. As a result of this fact, as well as of his subsequent actions and conduct, Pozsgay significantly contributed to increasing the opportunity for democratic forces to evolve, and to the possibility of peacefully dismantling the party state. In consideration of the above, we feel that we must not remain silent in response to Pozsgay's announcement. It remains unchanged that we regard Pozsgay as a significant political personality who, in our view, continues to have a place in Hungarian public life. For this reason, we wish him success and good health to his continuing public role in politics."

A source close to the National Board told our reporter that the words "opportunity for democratic forces to evolve" replaced the original wording of "opportunity for the forces of the Democratic Forum to evolve." This formula was rejected by a majority vote of the board. We learned that about 40 of the 75 members of the National Board took part in the Saturday conference. As far as we know, the presence of 38 members of the board at a meeting constitutes a quorum.

Amendments and supplemental provisions to the MDF draft bylaws were adopted at the meeting, according to a statement by MDF spokesman Imre Czako to the NEPSZABADSAG reporter. These amendments and supplemental provisions will be submitted for debate for the first time, in several alternative versions to the MDF membership.

A source close to the MDF National Presidium told our reporter that the question of whether the MDF should, or should not have an executive secretary in the future was the central issue of Saturday's debate. We learned from well informed circles that the new function was incorporated as part of the bylaws based on the suggestion of party chairman Jozsef Antall. This proposal did not have the unanimous support of the MDF National Presidium. The council of MDF chairmen in Budapest did not support the establishment of the "executive secretary's" post, according to reports. MDF leaders in Budapest believe that the chairman's political deputy should have the title of "deputy chairman." This person should be elected by the presidium, from among the members of the presidium, based on the chairman's recommendation. The council of MDF chairmen met in Budapest in the middle of last week. At that time, the council adopted a position in which it called upon the MDF presidium to resign as a body during the first day of the Fourth National Meeting to be held in mid-December. The MDF leaders of Budapest believe that this would be consistent with a resolution adopted by the Third National Meeting, as well as with "actual political considerations." At the same time, they recommended that Jozsef Antall be elected to the post of MDF chairman.

We were informed that participants at the Saturday meeting of the National Board did not approve a provision in the draft bylaws according to which the future

executive secretary would "not be elected by the National Meeting." Nor did the meeting approve a provision according to which the executive secretary would be appointed by the chairman. A source close to the MDF Board told NEPSZABADSAG that while Jozsef Antall, the present party chairman, endeavors to achieve the adoption of the proposal to establish an office of the executive secretary, he also wants to acquire a larger scope of authority in his capacity as party chairman. A source within the presidium told NEPSZABADSAG that it appeared that certain leaders of the MDF wanted to bar information from the party chairman concerning the real life of the MDF, and of the MDF's internal problems. They wanted to paint a brighter picture, rather than present the problems as they actually were, according to reports.

To the best of our knowledge, in a manner similar to the MDF parliamentary faction, the Saturday meeting of the National Board wanted to evaluate the cabinet's activities during the past six months, but such evaluation did not take place due to the shortage of time. It appears that the board will meet again on 8 December, prior to the Fourth National Meeting.

French Jewish Leader Regards MDF Conduct as Proper

91CH0199B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Nov 90 p 3

[Hungarian Telegraph Agency (MTI) report: "'Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) Conduct Proper'; Jean Kahn on Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe"]

[Text] Jean Kahn, chairman of the Federation of French Jewish Organizations, and soon to become chairman of the European Jewish Congress, regards the conduct of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and of the cabinet as proper, insofar as anti-Semitism is concerned. In its Friday issue, the French newspaper LIBERATION published an interview with Kahn concerning the threats presented by the revival of anti-Semitism in Europe.

"Some 100,000 Jews live in Hungary. This is the largest concentration of Jews after the Soviet Union. Signs indicate that the MDF, the ruling party, manifests proper conduct. Its right wing is attacking the free democrats [Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)], whose ranks include a certain number of Jews. Just as in the case of Poland, they criticize members of the intelligentsia, claiming that they are Jews. But even if the right wing of the MDF makes statements of an anti-Semitic character from time to time, the cabinet has renewed (diplomatic) relations with Israel. The Hungarian democratic system must not be viewed in a negative light in this regard," the noted representative of the French Jewry said.

Masses of Jews are leaving the Soviet Union because they feel threatened as a result of conduct manifested by ultranationalist organizations, and the state does not take advantage of opportunities provided by law to take

action against such organizations. As far as Poland is concerned, the French expert recognizes the anti-Semitic phenomena primarily in the lower strata of the clergy. He does not regard anti-Semitism as a particular threat in Bulgaria and Romania.

Editor's Note: One should add to the French article that diplomatic relations with Israel were renewed by the Nemeth government.

POLAND

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup

91EP0109A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 46, 17 Nov 90 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted] The regional prosecutor in Elblag has begun preparatory proceedings after leaflets appeared in Tolkmicko with antistate contents, calling, among other things, for a boycott of the elections and for a plebiscite on joining the region to Eastern Prussia (?), signed by the "Wolves of Eastern Prussia."

There are 141 generals in the Polish Army (one for every 2,200 soldiers). The majority of the 528 general positions are held by colonels. The youngest Polish General, Janusz Ornatowski, is 42. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the president of the Republic of Poland, became a general at age 33.

A delegation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs led by Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski visited Hungary. The agreement concerning cooperation between the Ministries of Internal Affairs was voided. It included, among other things, sharing of information on "the diversionary and propaganda activities of Chinese and Albanian diplomats and of others suspected of similar activities." The parties to the agreement were "to undertake joint operational efforts against the activities of religious groups and sects, especially the Roman Catholic Church, and other religious organizations."

The previous presidium of the Citizens Parliamentary Club chaired by Prof. Bronislaw Geremek submitted its resignation. Deputy Mieczyslaw Gill was elected the chairman of the club, and Senator Prof. Roman Duda was elected the deputy chairman. [passage omitted]

New coins with nominal values of 50 and 100 zlotys with the image of an eagle with a crown and the name of the Republic of Poland have gone into circulation.

In the consumption of cigarettes (total), Poland occupies seventh place in the world. Ahead of Poland are: China, the United States, the USSR, Japan, Brazil, and the former FRG. Behind Poland are: Italy, Great Britain, and France. When consumption of cigarettes is converted into per capita figures, it turns out that Poles, among the citizens of these countries, smoke the most.

Beginning 7 November, the Council of Ministers temporarily limited the importation of beer, wine, and cigarettes into Poland. Our importers must seek a permit in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. To obtain a permit, the firm must be registered. Only wholesalers are permitted to import wine and beer.

There were 1,794 individuals who committed border crimes during the first eight months of 1990. For attempting to cross or illegally crossing the border from Poland to the GDR, 117 citizens of African and Asiatic (including 93 from Pakistan) states were arrested, as well as 18 Romanians.

At the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an Office for Refugee Affairs has been opened. On 30 October 1990, there were 657 refugees in Poland, chiefly from African and Asiatic states, but also 44 from Albania, 28 from Romania, and eight from the USSR. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has refused to give refugee status to 300 foreigners in Poland. It is estimated that several tens of thousands of foreigners are in Poland illegally.

A partnership Polnippon led by the former deputy premier, Ireneusz Sekula, intends to build an oil refinery in the vicinity of Police. It will transport the oil from Swinoujscie either by pipeline or directly on smaller tankers.

The Main Council of the German Associations of the Republic of Poland has decided to deprive Dietmar A. Brehmer of the title of secretary general and of all his functions in the Council. This was done in his absence, while D.A. Brehmer was in Germany at the congress of the Union of Expellees. He presented, as he told a PAP journalist, a plan for cooperation and constructive activities, to benefit good neighborly arrangement of mutual relations.

The Main Council of the Association of Polish Journalists has called for complete openness and social control of the auctions of the former journals of the former Workers' Publishing Cooperative. Among the criteria for conducting the auctions should be the protection of the interests of the state, protection of the press against any monopoly, retention of titles of significance for Polish culture, and also the clause on convictions, i.e., guaranteeing journalists damages in cases when they leave an editorial staff because of differences in political views with the new owner of the publications.

Father Jerzy Tomzinski, the prior of the cloister on Jasna Gora, announced that he had not given permission for presidential candidate Stanislaw Tyminski to be filmed in the chapel of the Miraculous Portrait of the Virgin Mary and he protested against the use of this film material on television for political purposes.

Polish citizens who lived in the current territory of Lithuanian and owned land, buildings, factories, or stores before the war should not count on regaining their property or receiving compensation, although Lithuanian is planning privatization. Kazimiera Prunskiene,

the premier of Lithuania, made the announcement and added that Lithuania can only apologize to these people.

The Krosno Citizens Committee has decided to dissolve itself and transferred its assets to the foundation "Solidarity for Handicapped Children." The declaration of the Krosno Citizens Committee: "The political changes, which have occurred in Poland during the past year, especially the existence of genuine pluralism, have made it possible for each individual to participate in an organization that reflects his ideology and politics.... We believe that the Citizens Committees have fulfilled their role in creating conditions for the formation of democracy in Poland." [passage omitted]

Prof. Jan Dowgiallo (age 58) of the Institute of Geological Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, chairman of the All-Polish Consultation Commission of NSZZ Solidarity at the Polish Academy of Sciences, has been named ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Israel.

The newsstands have received the first issues of the monthly DZIS, a social review. The editor in chief is Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski.

The employees at Wifama in Lodz have made a hussar's sword for Lech Walesa. On the blade on one side are engraved the words "Honor and Fatherland" and the image of an eagle with a crown and on the other the image of the Mother of God and the words, "When fear grips me, grant me help, Mother of God."

The senate of the Jagiellonian University has awarded Jerzy Turowicz, the editor in chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY a doctorate honoris causa.

We entered November 1990 with 1,008,419 unemployed, including 514,020 women. Most of the unemployed are registered in the Bydgoszcz, Kielce, Katowice, and Lodz Voivodships. Unemployment has already reached 7.5 percent of those employed in the national economy (outside of agriculture). In Suwalki, however, the index has already reached 10.3 percent; in the Ciechanow and Olsztyn Voivodships, unemployment exceeds 8.9 percent. [passage omitted]

Elections of new rectors are continuing. Prof. Jozef Kaleta has taken over the helm of the Wroclaw Academy of Economics; Docent Jerzy Stuhr has taken over at the Krakow State Higher Theater School. [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Dr Jerzy Drygalski, chairman of the Liquidation Commission of the Workers' Publishing Cooperative on the proposed Gornoslaski Press Center:

(Interviewed by Leslaw Maleszka, GAZETA KRAKOWSKA 31 October-1 November 1990)

[Answer] For some time, reports have been reaching us of the penetration of the Slask press market by German

capital, which has desired to purchase a series of titles through agents. The creation of a center to be taken over by the government and gradually privatized through auctions will make it possible to retain the press in Polish hands. Perhaps our fears are overblown, but I think that in this situation we cannot make a mistake.

[Question] What mistake? About 200,000 Germans live in Slask. Why should they not have their own papers?

[Answer] They can organize publications without interference. Polish law also does not forbid them to take advantage of financial support from German institutions.

Dr. Yuriy Kashlev, ambassador of the Soviet Union to Poland:

(Interviewed by Piotr Grochmalski, WPROST 4 November 1990)

[Question] Mr. Ambassador, do you know what role ambassadors of the Soviet Union to Poland have previously played?

[Answer] Their assignment was reduced to making sure that your country properly proceeded along the path of Marxism-Leninism. They were governor generals of a province. When the system that had previously been in force in the Soviet Union changed, we adopted the principle of free decision on its fate by each nation and nonintervention in its domestic affairs. [passage omitted]

Lidia Ciolkoszowa, honorary chairperson of the united Polish Socialist Party [PPS], previously the leader of the emigre Polish Socialist Party:

(Interviewed by Andrzej Friszke, GAZETA WYBORCZA 5 November 1990)

[Question] Will the government and the president in London end their mission after the presidential elections?

[Answer] We have always said that the president and government would end their mission when free, democratic elections to parliament can be held in Poland. That moment is coming, but, please notice, we have spoken of parliamentary elections, not of presidential ones.

Only then will the president be able to hand over the insignia of the continuity of the state into the hands of the newly elected president in Poland.

Lipski on Need To Unite Socialist Parties

90EP0099A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
26 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Jan Jozef Lipski, chairman, Polish Socialist Party [PPS], by Joanna Krawczyk; place and date not given: "Toward a Strong PPS"]

[Text] [Krawczyk] When I interviewed you six months ago, you stated that soon the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] would band together with the other groups that arose following the split within its ranks in 1988—the PPS Provisional National Committee [TKK] and the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution [PPS-RD]. Why, then, did you decide to hold the congress which is to begin on 27 October, and during which these groups are to be combined into one PPS?

[Lipski] It has turned out that for us everything depends on this. We came to understand that one stronger PPS would have greater significance than several small parties.

[Krawczyk] But your party is declaring social democratic ideas, while there are young radicals in the PPS-RD. The comment was even made once that on the left side of this group there stands only a wall. And so you are linked together in name alone.

[Lipski] We are prepared to have a more radical wing. Please keep in mind, however, that an autonomous group of Trotskyites, which were once part of the PPS-RD, has departed from this group. Since the leaders of the PPS-RD felt it was important to unify, they themselves got rid of the Trotskyites. I hope that the epithet "democratic revolution" will no longer stand alongside the name PPS, for this epithet is actually out of keeping with the idea of social democracy. Despite appearances, the present program differences between our parties are not major and the program adopted by the congress will certainly involve some compromise. For the present I observe that the members of the PPS-RD are placing greater hopes in the self-government movement in labor plants than we are. In my judgment, however, this should not conflict with the views of the social democrats.

[Krawczyk] I see yet another argument supporting the unification, an argument you surely do not wish to discuss. It is simply a question of finances. After the war the PPS lost significant assets—publishing houses, print shops, and apartment buildings. Being combined together will make it easier to recover these assets.

[Lipski] That is not true. You have trivialized the idea of the congress; our assets are not the primary motive underlying the unification. Easier to recover them? Do you know how much money we would have to have in order to initiate legal proceedings in these matters? Besides, in order to begin an attempt to recover our assets, we would merely have to come to an understanding with the PPS Central Foreign Committee. (That is the emigre PPS, whose delegates are also taking

part in the congress. It is due to the emigration that the continuity of the PPS has been preserved since 1892).

[Krawczyk] Which PPS party will have the greatest numbers at the congress?

[Lipski] The Understanding Commission determined that every group will obtain one mandate for every 10 members. In this situation the representatives of the group to which I belong will dominate. However, in order to eliminate too much disproportion, we have given up a certain number of mandates on behalf of the members of other parties.

[Krawczyk] People laugh that the PPS parties, which hark back to a long and splendid tradition of being one of the largest Polish political groups, have now been reduced to groups so small everyone can fit on one sofa. After the Unification Congress will the sofa become too crowded?

[Lipski] It already is too crowded, but in my estimation our party will continue not to be too large. My guess is that it will have about 3,000 members...

[Krawczyk] ...who will include parliamentarians such as you are, a group of intellectuals and students. I cannot think of a single member of your party who is a worker. But it was the workers who were once the strongest pillar of the PPS.

[Lipski] We have workers; they constitute half of our active members. For example, one of the members of the PPS Supreme Council Presidium, Stanislaw Kubica of Bielsko-Biala, is a worker. I do admit, however, that in the present situation, it is not easy to reach this group, and not because financial difficulties will make it hard for us to publish *ROBOTNIK*, our daily newspaper. Society takes a very dim view of socialism, associating it with decades of communist governments. Do you know what would be most beneficial to us? If we changed our name and did not use the word socialism in our name. Paradoxically, the tradition to which we hark back constitutes a serious obstacle to our existence on the public scene. Society is tired of communism which has adopted the designation socialism. Society reacts negatively to this term, rejects it and does not even try to enter into the essence of socialism and social democracy. On the other hand, the PPS would readily gain support if we were to act in the present time of hardship to society by taking advantage of that sort of far-reaching populist demagoguery of that exceeds the bounds of responsibility. Certainly, this would allow us to increase our membership and electorate, but it would not be in line with the principles by which the PPS was guided in the past.

[Krawczyk] But I do not believe that the socialists will succeed in working actively in Poland without a social base. In Warsaw your pre-congress posters were inscribed with the telling phrase "Poland for the People." What sort of people do you have in mind?

[Lipski] First I will tell you where that poster came from, since it is an interesting story. It is a photograph of something that was written on a wall. We do not even know to whom the honorarium should go. The people to whom we wish to address our program are a very broad group of working people which includes intellectuals, health service employees, engineers—in a word, primarily hired employees. Obviously, we rely especially on workers, who constitute the traditional base of the PPS, a large group which has inspired changes in Poland for decades. One of the main assumptions of our program is precisely to protect employee interests in the situation of the building of capitalism in our country, during the time of extensive privatization and the shock treatment anti-inflation policy. I am aware that someone could say to me that this is in the working people's interest and that in 20 years Poland will become a booming country and so now it is worthwhile for us to tighten our belts. But we fear the sort of "generational imperialism" which says that we shall have to sacrifice one or even two generations in the name of a bright future. We have no certainty that we shall succeed in building an economically strong state such as the West Germans or the Spaniards have, for example. We have no certainty that our state will not turn out to be a country like Brazil or Mexico.

[Krawczyk] The PPS is not the only socialist party in Poland: the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and the Polish Social Democratic Union also aspire to the ideals of the left. A definite leftist option likewise appears in the Citizens Movement—Democratic Action [ROAD]. Thus, while there is no void on the left side of our political life, there is much chaos. Does the PPS envisage future cooperation with any of these groups?

[Lipski] Right now it is difficult for me to answer that question. I do not imagine that it will be possible for us to cooperate with the post-PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] SdRP, since this group continues to represent the interests of former Communists who fought against the PPS and who imprisoned many of our activists in the past. What they have in common with social democracy only comes to light now. Meanwhile, given their past, these "social democrats" simply lack credibility. Two workers stood at the head of ROAD—Zbigniew Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasnysniuk, but they also steer clear of identifying themselves with the left, as do the intellectuals in their group such as Michnik. However, I do not rule out the possibility that there may be some sort of understanding with this movement in the future since we are linked by common ties with a Solidarity past, by the avowed desire to defend the interests of workers and hired laborers and by ties of friendship. All indications are, however, that the PPS will really remain the ranking social democratic party. After the congress we shall seek membership (with full rights) in the Socialist Internationale. Had we proceeded a little more quickly with the Unification Congress, this would have already happened at the last conference of

the Internationale in New York at the beginning of October. At this conference and at the previous conference, which took place in Cairo, only that party which I represent was invited from Poland.

[Krawczyk] There is no doubt that given Poland's current political and economic situation, the time has come for the representatives of parties with centrist and center-rightist programs to take governments into their own hands. In spite of this, will the PPS compete for a place in the new parliamentary structure and, possibly, in the government structure?

[Lipski] Yes, we shall enter the parliamentary elections, but I realize that our chances are not very good. I do believe, however, that in the course of the next two to three years society will come to understand the need for the existence of a strong social democracy. I am certain that we will be able to count on success in the next parliamentary elections. At that time a success would mean getting several persons from the PPS list into parliament.

Country's Splintered Socialist Parties Unite

91EP0095A Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC*
in Polish No 44, 2 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by W.G.: "Once More a United Polish Socialist Party"]

[Text] There is a single united Polish Socialist Party [PPS] again. J. J. Lipski's PPS, W. Olejnik's emigre CKZ PPS [Central Committee Abroad—Polish Socialist Party], Ikonowicz's PPS-RD [Polish Socialist Party—Democratic Revolution], and G. Ilka's TTK-PPS [Provisional National Commission of Polish Socialist Party] merged at the 25th Congress of the PPS, which headed the independence movement nearly a century ago. Lidia Cioikoszowa, an 88-year-old matriarch of the socialist movement, sponsored the unification effort, presenting a witty address and watchfully taking an active part in the board's work throughout the congress.

The PPS declares itself to be a leftist party, the political representative of wage earners (those who will always be selling their labor), a party growing up out of Solidarity. The keynote address pointed out that although it is these very employees that won the fight against a totalitarian state, they now have nobody to represent of their interests. ROAD [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action] and the Center Accord [PC] have been organized by groups aspiring to be future owners of an economy being converted from on high to private ownership, while SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] has been set up by nomenclature groups, and the peasants are represented by the PSL [Polish Peasant Party].

PPS considers the worker self-governing bodies and NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity to be its chief allies.

The congress passed an important resolution categorically ruling out any possibility of cooperating with the postcommunist political structures.

In the course of a fierce discussion over the statutes, the delegates rejected an appeal to permit a wide range of factions. PPS is to be a party, not a federation.

In addition to the program, two papers by J. Dziewulski and M. Gruchelski were accepted as PPS documents. These papers denounce the Balcerowicz plan in its entirety. The PPS is accusing the government of failure to repudiate the concept of a mixed economy, which Solidarity had proposed back during the time of the Roundtable, and chose instead the road to rapid construction of a capitalist state. Except for the elite, which is enriching itself, this latter path brings with it catastrophic results for society, especially for wage earners. According to PPS's interpretation, Balcerowicz was wrong when he listed the sources of inflation, because it is based on supply (low productivity) rather than on demand (too much money in circulation). In such a situation, Balcerowicz's monetaristic strategy has no chance. It will lead to recession, mass unemployment, stagflation, and soon afterward to renewed inflation. Gruchelski is therefore suggesting actions to promote supply, for example, by introducing "perpetual motion" in the economy for five to seven years. Most employees would have to work two hours more every other day.

Some of the economic instruments recommended, especially the overenthusiasm concerning the prospects for the employee self-governing body, have a character of utopian illusions. Despite this fact, it is true that another program of alternatives to Balcerowicz's plan appeared (the Center Accord and PSL had previously formulated a less drastic one.) Maybe now the centrally guided propaganda will finally denounce the humorous hypothesis that government policy "has no alternative?"

Will the PPS leftist program win over the working masses? The only certainty is that PPS activists will find it difficult to reach workers for the trite reason that PPS—about the last group—is obliged to use the term "comrade," a term which has become repugnant in Poland. Emigres from the West have instilled this custom again. Is the nostalgia for tradition more important to them than carrying out the goals of the program?

Opole Senator Attacks Union of Expellees' Koschyk on Minority Issue

91EP0097A Warsaw *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* in Polish
25 Oct 90 p 6

[Interview with Professor Dorota Simonides, senator from Opole and a member of ROAD [Citizens Movement—Democratic Action], by Michal Jaranowski, permanent correspondent in Bonn; place and date not given: "Silesia: Unite, Not Divide"]

[Text] [Jaranowski] You visited the Federal Republic of Germany at the invitation of the Association of Germans Abroad. I had the occasion of attending one of your public meetings on the subject of Silesia, Poles, and Germans. Was that a typical meeting in the sense that an explicit dividing line existed between the generations?

[Simonides] Definitely yes. The first to take the floor in the discussion was a representative of the German expellees. He touched upon a cultural issue, which he turned into a political one. This concerned the exportation of a book, his own, to be sure, but one published before 1945—and such things require an appropriate permit. After all, this concerns protection of masterworks of national culture. If he had applied for that permit, he would of a certainty been granted it. But he did not do so and presented the matter as an assault against German culture. Another characteristic moment was a speech by a Silesian who had emigrated [to Germany] in 1989. He spoke of Hitler's tolerance. That was the typical zeal of a neophyte, a person whose inferiority complex prompts him to demonstrate that he is more German than the Germans. I meet people like that quite often.

At first there was a lot of demagoguery. But honestly I had expected sharper discussion. In Poland, at the opposite pole, so to speak, I often encounter similar or even more pronounced nationalistic attitudes among our chauvinists. When I speak of bilingual church prayers in the past, of the twin cultural track in, especially, Silesian Opole, these people refuse to believe me and immediately attack me. My tactic consists in refraining from defending myself, and letting the audience do it for me. That was what happened in Bonn. The young people there spoke beautifully about the need for spiritual unity.

[Jaranowski] Do you have such meetings often?

[Simonides] In Germany, yes. In Bonn, for example, I expected an audience of at most 30, but more than 100 people showed up, which points to the interest of various milieux in this topic. I had expected to be booed. I am an Upper Silesian, but I feel Polish and I presented the matters as seen from the standpoint of Polish *raison d'état*.

[Jaranowski] One of those meetings was special: a panel discussion on television with the Secretary General of the Association of Expellees Hartmut Koschyk.

[Simonides] At first I had refused thrice, but when I was told that the discussion would be broadcast live, I accepted the proposal, so as to be able to tell Koschyk that he was building his political career on the shoulders of the German minority.

[Jaranowski] How did he react?

[Simonides] He did not understand what I meant. And then, point after point, I proved that his promises were unrealistic. Namely, [such promises as] the return of Silesia within the boundaries of 1937 and, next, pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Germany, its incorporation in Germany. And once I had demonstrated the fallacy of these notions, he began to argue in favor of the Europeanization of Silesia. I declared that that was a nebulous theory and the real issue was to extract Silesia from Polish sovereignty, by such means as collecting signatures. Thereupon he generously declared that Poles, too, may sign, because they too would like to own Mercedes Benz cars. I then said, "You visit Silesia two or three times a week [as published] and awaken false hopes among people. You go back, and their frustration grows.... It is difficult to build a future with embittered people."

[Jaranowski] Is not that because the Association of Expellees exists in a kind of vacuum?

[Simonides] Yes, precisely. I had discussed this with, among others, the Speaker of the Bundestag Mrs. Suessmuth, the Secretary of State at the Ministry for Inner-German Relations Mr. Hennig, and the Chairman of the Central Association of Middle and Eastern Germans and SPD [Social Democratic Party] Deputy to the Bundestag Sielaff, and also at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Ministry of the Interior. My position was that we should build together rather than divide, that instead of "this is for Germans" we should have "this is for the region," and that we should promote integration instead of segregation. I wish to emphasize that I met with complete understanding from my collocutors.

The "landsmen" [expellees] have been acting very consistently and, by the nature of things, are filling a vacuum. But theirs is not good work, because it divides, it revives resentments and conflicts. Thus, they should be escorted out of Silesia and, instead, the aforementioned people and ideas let in—ideas of a common future. Only at the Ministry of the Interior we were told that Koschyk wants to open the Silesian road to Europe. I rejoined that Koschyk says one thing officially and does another. And the Bible teaches, "Thou shalt know him by his deeds." I gave them specific and documented instances of the views he presents to a small circle of intimates. They reduce it to the formula, "Only for Germans."

[Jaranowski] What is, in your opinion, the extent of knowledge in Germany about the legal and actual changes taking place in Silesia?

[Simonides] I was surprised how well informed all the people I spoke with were. This facilitated the task I had posed to myself before coming here, that of warning authoritative politicians against the polarization of Silesia. The [German] minority has become clearly radicalized, and they began to feel themselves more like citizens of Germany than of Poland. On its part, the Polish side definitely does not place sufficient emphasis on the obligation of these people to be loyal to the Polish state. Concerning that matter I met with complete understanding on the part of everybody without exception, and I hope that the German side will express it clearly. The dominant view was that belonging to the German

minority in Poland was one thing, but being a Polish citizen implies an obligation of loyalty to the Polish state and respect for Polish laws. This concerns in particular government officials paid from the same till. Following the elections to local governments in Poland there occurred cases in which a burgomaster belonging to the German minority removed the Polish emblem of statehood. To the people I spoke with [in Germany] this was incomprehensible.

[Jaranowski] In Bonn certain laws governing resettlers have been revised. What reactions do you anticipate in Silesia?

[Simonides] The Bundestag law of 1 July has tightened the criteria for people wanting to settle in Germany. As a result, in my opinion, the artificial growth of the German minority in Poland will decrease. After all, many Upper Silesians had declared [their Germanness] in the hope of emigrating. But now a person who is really a German must present documentary proof to the German consulate in Poland. Persons who visit Germany on a tourist visa can no longer count on being granted that status.

[Jaranowski] Thank you for the interview.

Eastern Border Groups Stress Ethnic Issues

Janowicz on Belorussian Party

90EP0104A Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 Oct 90
p 2

[Interview with Belorussian poet Sokrat Janowicz, at his mother's home in Krynki, by Barbara Stasko; date not given: "The Belorussians at the Crossroads: Being Ourselves"]

[Text] I had the good fortune to speak with Sokrat Janowicz, not at his apartment in a Bialystok apartment house, "where the asphalt tears a man away from his roots," but in his native habitat. I spoke with him in his "marvelous Krynki, buried in a valley...creating the impression of a suddenly spotted, enormous reef of colored shells amid seaweed of birches and poplars" (from "Belorussia, Belorussia").

And so we spoke in the natural surroundings of this eminent Belorussian poet, writer and, only recently, politician, in the place where a common fate has bound the Poles and Belorussians for 600 years. It was there in 1434 that Prince Kiejstutowicz rode out to meet Jagiello, and there in the borderlyng Kryniec Castle that the political union between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was renewed.

He was born in Krynki, on Sokol Street, but not in this house where his mother now lives, a house surrounded by an orchard and vegetable garden glorying in fall colors. From Krynki he went out into the world—to

Bialystok, and then to Warsaw, where he studied. First technical studies, then language and literature—Belorussian and Polish.

He is the poet and writer of the borderland, that always fertile area penetrated by various cultures, out of which Mickiewicz and Slowacki, Orzeszkowa, Milosz and Konwicki emanated, to name the most famous ones. It is impossible to create culture in a place closed in by four blank walls, he says. And he adds, contradicting himself, that "those of us who live here as a national minority surpass the Poles. In what?—they ask angrily. I reply: in the fact that we operate in two languages, in two cultures, which is something of which the average Pole cannot boast. And the more cultures one knows, the richer he is. What is the significance of building a European home? It is the desire for people to operate within various cultures. This multiculturalism is the future of the world."

[Stasko] How many Belorussians live here along the border? No one really knows.

[Janowicz] We are not concerned with that, for we continue to stand as a nation, although we are delayed in our national formation. But that is also the case with many people who considered themselves Poles yesterday and today are reaching back for their Belorussian roots.

[Stasko] According to estimates, there are about 300,000 Belorussians.

[Janowicz] We are a fragment of the Belorussian nation. We have inhabited this Bialystok area since time immemorial, for it is a fragment of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania which once reached along the line of the Narwa as far as Siedlce.

[Stasko] There are many areas in the Bialystok region where the Belorussian language is dominant.

[Janowicz] People speak Belorussian but they consider themselves Poles. If someone were in a position to make them aware of Belorussian history, many of them would certainly consider themselves Belorussians. But there are no such opportunities—it is a matter of a school, mass media coverage, observing traditions and, finally, the Church. The Roman Catholic Church clearly exerts influence in the direction of Polonization. The Catholic priests of our area are very anti-Belorussian and do not permit any sort of tolerance. Sometimes the situation reaches simply inhumane moral pressures to use the Polish language."

[Stasko] How does a Belorussian in Poland feel?

[Janowicz] He does not feel good. Finding himself in a Polish milieu puts him in a constant state of tension. This state of tension disappears when he is in his own ethnic areas where the Belorussian element is dominant. And there are neighborhoods here, areas between Bielsk Podlaski and Hajnowka, where there are no Poles at all, especially in rural areas. And so the Belorussian feels like

a fish in water for he is among his own people. But when he comes into town, to Bialystok, for example, he must be cautious.

[Stasko] Why so?

[Janowicz] Because the Poles are afflicted with an anti-Russian complex. They often do not differentiate the Belorussians from the Russians because we attend the Orthodox churches and our alphabet is a modified Cyrillic alphabet. Add to this differences in personality type—the Belorussians are phlegmatic types who experience a real shock when they come into contact with the Poles. To us the average Pole is a choleric type who is always running somewhere, always fretting, and never has any time. We do not tolerate haste and we always have time. And we like to work slowly and deliberately and not just get the job done to get it over with.

From what does this emanate? Perhaps from a more mystical attitude to the world. Among Poles this attitude is more rational, for Roman Catholicism is also more rationalistic than the mystical Orthodoxy. Perhaps it also has to do with the fact that we lived in isolation so long and that we are similar from a psychological standpoint to today's Lithuanians, who were once called Samogitians. And perhaps it is also due to our ethnic history, for the Belorussian type was formed from the crossing of the Slavs and the Balts, just as the Poles are a Slavic-Celtic mixture.

[Stasko] Let us speak about the Belorussian Democratic Union [BZD], of which you are one of the cofounders. At the present time it is the only national minorities party in Poland.

[Janowicz] We do not like the term "national minority" very much. It would be appropriate if we were emigrants dispersed throughout the country. But we are not emigrants; we have been living on our own land for at least 1,000 years. We are part of the Belorussian nation of 10 million people. And we believe what is written in the BZD statute, that the part that is located in the Republic of Poland should be called the Belorussian nation of the Polish Republic. Why are we the only party among a so-called minority? I was surprised that the Ukrainians, for example, who certainly outdo us in terms of dynamism, not to mention national consciousness and their degree of organization, did not create such a party. I think that is because they are dispersed throughout Poland. As for the Lithuanians, there are too few of them; essentially they are located in one gmina. The German minority in the Opole region is just becoming organized. Thus I believe that we are the only group to have created a party because we are relatively large in number and because we occupy a relatively large area, i.e., almost the entire Bialystok Voivodship except for its western reaches, which are in Mazury.

[Stasko] Some people call you the party of the Eastern Wall.

[Janowicz] The Eastern Wall is a socioeconomic concept, another name for economic-civilizational backwardness. In my estimation, the primary reason for the existence and operation of the BZD is the struggle to prevent the civilization of this area from dying. No Polish national force, no party is interested in principle in this struggle. They see the entire country and so they have a different field of vision, which is not a regional one.

We are also called a gmina party. We realize that our importance does not extend very far beyond the level of the gmina council or the wojt but that we do have something to say in the gminas. At this time we have our own officials in seven gminas, where Belorussian council members constitute the majority or where they are even totally in charge. In the gmina of Grodek, for example, only one council member is not from our party, but from the PSL [Polish Peasant Party]. In Hajnowka or Bielsk Podlaski our council members constitute approximately one-half.

What do we want? Above all, to keep an economic black hole from being created, to ward off the further depopulation of the area and to prevent economic ruin. For as far as Poland is concerned, we could perish right now and the country would not even notice. Economically, Poland does not need us; our share in Poland's economy is about 0.2-0.3 percent. This is primarily an agricultural area and everyone knows the sort of crisis that Polish agriculture is now undergoing. This crisis impacts on the backward Eastern Wall above all.

But we are counting on two opportunities. One of these is associated with the emancipation of the Belorussian Republic, which will enter into a period of economic autonomy beginning in the new year. We want to open a Belorussian market for our products. Belorussia, which has suffered 70 percent of the effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe (and the proportions of this catastrophe are equivalent to the explosion of 350 bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), finds itself in a clearly tragic situation: one-third of its land is unfit for human habitation. This area must be cordoned off and reforested. This means resettling more than 2 million people. They will have need of food and construction materials. We are, to some degree, in a position to ensure them both of these, and this would be to our advantage as well. In conjunction with this, we are very hopeful about the results of Minister Skubiszewski's visit to Minsk and we anticipate good results from the draft of the appointment of an economic mission of the Belorussian Republic. Teams from Belorussian firms have already visited us— young people who are primarily engineers and businessmen just starting out. They have even concluded several agreements, for example, with the gminas of Orla and Narewka. This trade would encompass the sale of potatoes, grain, meat, bricks, tiles, and handicrafts. These sales would not be for rubles, but along the lines of a sort of poor man's barter, for example, potatoes in exchange for refrigerators or tractors and bricks for glass, which could then be sold elsewhere to obtain money for the further development of the region.

The other opportunity is emigre capital. There are not many Belorussian businessmen in the world, but we do not need many, since the area covers about 20 gminas. That is what brings me here to Krynkki today. I have been taking around the region a group of Belorussians from the U.S., Canada, and France who would like to invest their money here.

The BZD posits economic progress as the primary target of its activity, while cultural and national development take second place for us. For if we do not save ourselves economically, then both our culture and our language will disappear. We want to keep pace civilizationally with the rest of the country. By saving ourselves as the Belorussian nation in the Polish Republic, we shall thereby save this portion of the Polish Republic as well. By saving ourselves we shall save a part of the homeland.

The Poles of this region are not so attached to their place of residence, for they have a much larger homeland, the whole of Poland. Meanwhile, the Belorussian will always try to hold on to this land, to reside here where his nest, his cradle lies. It should be understood that we are a kind of guarantee that this land will not turn into a desert, that civilization will be alive here, that they will save the country towns, that agriculture will save them. This is something they do not seem to understand in Bialystok. They continually suspect us of some sort of separatism, but we just want to be ourselves, we want to save ourselves. Nothing more! Sometimes we are accused of wanting to join the Belorussian Republic. That is simply absurd! We are primarily an agricultural people. And what farmer in Poland would want to be incorporated into the kolkhoz? In the second place, in our country one just ekes out an existence, sometimes things are worse and sometimes they are better. And no one wants to leave a better situation for a worse one. Besides, when we reach the point of building this new Europe, a Europe without borders, the problem of separatism will lose all sense.

Minority Complaints in Bielsk

91EP0104B Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 26 Oct 90
p 2

[Article by Barbara Stasko: "Belorussians at the Crossroads: What Sort of Common Home Is It?"]

[Text] The town hall is a most beautiful one in Bielsk Podlaski: it has two stories, it is white with a red tile roof that slopes in the four directions. A spire tipped with a flag towers over the tin cupola. Beneath is an insect made of tin, a symbol of the locust plague that once afflicted the town. There is also the date 1779 and below the turrets the coat of arms of the city, one of the oldest cities in Podlesie.

Along Mickiewicz Street, which is the business district, one hears both a dialect of Polish and the melodious speech that mimics the East Slavic languages. The walls are still covered with torn posters from the May self-government elections: candidates from the Solidarity

KO [Citizens Committee], from Democratic Forces [a local coalition] led by the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], and from two electoral committees—the Belorussian committee and the Rusko-Ukrainian committee.

Here, along the former Lithuanian-Mazovian border, various nationalities have lived together since time immemorial. They have had their ups and downs. But the former animosities and even overt hostility of the prewar and immediate postwar periods have faded.

Today in the city, which has a population of under 27,000, the faithful attend three Catholic churches and three Orthodox churches. Until recently no one was particularly interested in whether a neighbor would pray to Our Lady of Czestochowa or before an icon. But now the local residents are divided: into Catholics and Orthodox. I am told that the latter have begun to be afraid. Officially they explain their reluctance to give either their real first names or, even more, their last names, by saying: "You have to understand us. You will leave and we must remain behind. Everybody knows one another here and we can lose our jobs." Unofficially, however, several of them add that they, the residents of a city ruled by Solidarity, are afraid to give personal criticism of local relations, especially for a newspaper, the new format of which is associated with the former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party].

Provocation

Alarming signals began to appear in Bielsk before the May elections. The following words were scribbled on the posters of some council member candidates: "This is a Belorussian. Consider whom you are voting for!" The slogans "Belorussians Go East" appeared on the walls alongside indiscriminate attacks on the "commies." These assaults were so very unscrupulous that the matter was even brought before the court in Bialystok. This court ordered Bielsk Solidarity activists to erase the offensive parts of their posters. Jerzy Szunejko from the SdRP, who was a candidate for council member, relates how he was handed a flier warning against him, "a former Communist and defender of the Belorussians." Ms. Halina, who says of herself, "I am a Polish woman of Belorussian descent," confirms that she herself saw such fliers and similar ones posted on the Bielsk PKS [State Motor Transport] station. She was deeply mortified. So was Mr. Bazyli, a builder, who asked me in an agitated tone whether he, who for more than 30 years had been building houses and factories for people in Suwalki and the Bialystok area, deserved to read on a Bielsk wall: "A good Belorussian is a dead Belorussian."

He came to Bielsk many years ago, when the city numbered 8,000 residents, there were four streets and five houses laid out in the shape of a cross. And today? It is evident how everything has developed and how much the city has been built up! It was no one but the Belorussians that did this. The Catholics ran away—to Bialystok, Lomza, and Warsaw. The capital of the

administrative district was here; here it was possible to detach oneself from a lower social level. And for the diligent Belorussian it was a privilege to work in Bielsk. And in an office too!

Thus people came to Bielsk from rural areas for gainful employment. And they worked in various plants.

They were also in government, and, of course, in the former militia. It is natural for 60 or even 70 percent of Bielsk residents to be Orthodox.

Divisions

The masses did not come out for last year's Sejm election. They were upbraided for this by Bielsk area Solidarity Sejm deputy Beszta-Borowski at an open public meeting held about February, at which he also said that the cradle of the commune is here, that people live here who are not worthy of the life of Poles.

The Orthodox were afraid of Solidarity, which demonstrated a combative sort of Catholicism at every turn. And they also began to fear that the slogan of canceling out the past with a bold stroke would appear only on paper and in official addresses. That is why they created their own committees before this year's election: a Belorussian committee and a Ukrainian committee. They wanted to show their independence, to separate themselves from the former authority under the new circumstances, and to defend their own interests by themselves, especially since it had been stated precisely from the pulpits of Bielsk churches whom they should vote for.

In May Solidarity won in Bielsk Podlaski. Forty-three percent of the electorate voted, but thanks to the majority electoral law, the KO gained 16 mandates on a 28-member Municipal Council. The remaining 12 slots were divided as follows: eight went to the Belorussian Committee, three went to the SdRP, and one went to the Ukrainian Committee.

Janusz Panasiuk, one of the SdRP council members, said: "The friction may have begun with the election of the burgomaster. It may have begun because there was only one candidate, the chief of the local Solidarity. And this is a man with a basic vocational school education, a foreman in a milk plant. Thus, there was some question as to whether he would be able to deal with the many problems of the city." "We could have created a pat situation—12 versus 16—but we did not want to cause provocation, to create conflict," say the council members from the BKW [Belorussian Electoral Committee], who hoped that "their" person would at least be elected deputy burgomaster. But no: both deputies were also KO activists.

At the beginning it was not too bad. The new burgomaster, Kazimierz Leszczynski, assured that there would not be too many layoffs in the Municipal Office with the exception of those layoffs which would result from changes in the qualifications for office. But layoffs there

were: as many as 23 of them. And these were not due to full-time staff cutbacks, which would be understandable, but primarily due to changes in the former managerial cadre. They were also done for other reasons. The new management was Catholic, associated with the KO, say those who were affected by the layoffs. "Not all of those who were dismissed belonged to the former PZPR, but all were Orthodox," says Ms. Halina.

Another thing: following the layoffs, wage increases were given. The guideline was the following: Catholics received much greater increases while Orthodox received much less, or nothing at all. "By now we have had too much," she continued. And she resents the fact that both the layoffs and the increases were not based on qualifications, on good work, which should count for the most, but on who goes to which church. She then gave the example of Hajnowka, where many Belorussians also live and where there is also a new burgomaster from Solidarity, one who knows how not to antagonize the public.

Those who were wronged began to protest and write in any way possible: to the voivode of Bialystok, to the sejmik, to the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers], to Kuron, and to deputies, including Cimoszewicz.

"There was no response whatsoever," they said in chorus. "Only Mr. Cimoszewicz, although he is not a deputy from the Bielsk area per se, had the moral courage to take our part from the Sejm platform. "We know him well. He was here twice and we were very taken by his concern for all the residents' problems. This man is worth listening to, he has credibility!"

The Sejm address of deputy Cimoszewicz evoked a reaction from both sides. The group of Bielsk council members (14, all from the KO) sent a sharp protest to the Sejm marshal of the Polish Republic against the "alleged discrimination against municipal officials due to their Belorussian descent and their Orthodox religion." In protest, in addition to much malice directed at the PKLD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left] deputy, a long letter of "sins of the Orthodox" was also found. The conclusion to be drawn from the letter [is] that it was the Catholics who had been formerly discriminated against in Bielsk. For example, in the schools, the numerical relationship of directors was eight to three; in the Municipal Office, only 21.3 percent were Catholic. The heaviest weapon was also brought out: that the Orthodox constituted 100 percent of the makeup of the SB [Security Service] and approximately 90 percent of the MO [Citizens Militia].

All of my Orthodox subjects, both those who were laid off and the BKW council members, believe the data to be quite unscientific. And they ask whether the fact that through the entire 1980's the local Solidarity lived here as snug as a bug in a rug and that no one, not a single person, was interned is without meaning.

Resentment

They are most resentful of that opposition which says that they are "a people with Polish roots who have become Russified and signed up by force to the Orthodox Church during the Russian annexation." Someone with no sense of history wrote this, says one of the BKW council members, handing me a book, a monograph on Bielsk which was published several years ago. It is written in this book in black-and-white that from the dawn of centuries people of various faiths have lived here.

They are most resentful of the separation of people into two categories. One must admit that this did not happen under the previous authority.

"My impression of democracy is totally different from its face in this town," says a council member from BKW, who was recently in the West. "The fact that council members are separated into Orthodox and Catholics cries out for vengeance to heaven. There are countries where religious discrimination is a criminal act and where one is not permitted to ask questions about religious conviction at all, for it is a private matter for every citizen. So much is being said now in Poland about the return to Europe, but people are being divided into those who are better and those who are worse. The very form and content of this protest prove that the people who are now performing leadership roles in the city are as sure of themselves as the party once was. I myself witnessed how a Catholic priest in Bielsk said that the only religion in Poland is the Catholic religion, the government religion, for the government is Catholic."

They are also upset by the introduction of religion into the schools. "This automatically divides children into two groups—the Orthodox and the Catholic," says another BKW council member. He adds that it is strange that the Orthodox do not have any derogatory terms for Catholics, but, on the other hand, the Catholics have such a term for the Orthodox: they are called "kacapy" [derogatory term for Soviets]. To return to the school and religion, there have been many minor incidents, but no one takes much notice of these. But the example of the new school which is located in the building of the former party committee is telling. As they say here: the "white" children go upstairs for religion classes and the "red" ones go into the basement. The council member asks: "Is this supposed to be our common home that belongs to every person?"

Another BKW council member observes that, for example, the matter of layoffs and wage increases was incidental and should not be exaggerated, lest a sort of "second Lebanon" be created here.

"This is the border. Thus people are especially sensitive to every offensive word," says the director of one of the three major construction enterprises in Bielsk conciliatorily. "What would have gone unnoticed elsewhere in Poland, the various incidents and epithets, causes a stir here and gets people going."

Mikolaj Chrol, the only Ukrainian council member, a self-employed veterinarian, maintains that under Bielsk conditions, a very wise authority is needed to weigh and consider any changes to be made in light of the specifics of the local situation.

Burgomaster Kazimierz Leszczynski believes that the whole matter has been unnecessarily blown out of proportion. He laid off Orthodox Christians because they were in the majority, and moreover many of them got new jobs. They operated according to a completely different system. And he did not know whether all of these people would be able to shift over to another system of values and work. "All over Poland the new authorities are letting former employees go," he cuts in. Then he adds that it is not important for his deputy to be from the Orthodox religion: "We all live here together and it is of no significance whether I am Catholic or Orthodox, or whether my deputy is Catholic or Orthodox, since we represent the interests of all. Moreover, the KO won the election and has every right to fill positions with its own people."

"This selection of one's own people (and there are no exceptions to this rule) calls to mind the worst, darkest practices of the 1950's," concludes council member Panasiuk. And he wonders out loud whether the new authorities should not be dealing primarily with issues other than personnel matters, for example, the ever more threatening problem of unemployment, which is becoming a greater and greater danger in Bielsk as well.

Lemkos Seek Historical Rights, Affirm Loyalty to Polish Republic

91EP0098A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
30 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Pawel Stefanowski, head of the Lemko Citizens Circle, by Zaneta Semprich; place and date not given: "We Don't Want To Be a Bargaining Card"]

[Text] [Semprich] Hospodar [Sir], let us begin by demarcating the boundaries of the Lemko region. That is because too many people persist in the assumption that the Lemkos inhabited the Bieszczady.

[Stefanowski] This is some misunderstanding. Lemko villages stretched chiefly through Beskid Niski: from Szczawnica through Zegiestow, Krynica, Iwonicz, and as far as the Bieszczady, and specifically to Komancza and Dolzyca. It was there too that the boundary line ran between the Lemkos and the Boykos, Ruthenian Gorals [Mountaineers] like us. I say "Ruthenian," because not all the Lemkos, especially not those who are conservatively disposed, accept the more recent appellation "Ukrainian." That is because we were not involved in the formation of that appellation.

[Semprich] But that may also signify lack of a feeling of national identity as Ukrainians, lack of identification with Ukrainians.

[Stefanowski] No. The church has been and is a strong binding mortar. Like the Ukrainians, we profess the Greek Catholic or Orthodox religion.

[Semprich] Is it possible nowadays to determine how many Lemkos had lived in 1939 in the areas you named, and how many Poles?

[Stefanowski] The Lemko population then was estimated at about 250,000. Practically as many had emigrated by then, chiefly to the United States. As for Poles, few had lived there then. At most, one could speak of islets and islands of Polishness. But irrespective of this, several Polish families each used to live in many Lemko villages. They were spoken of as "our Poles."

[Semprich] The Lemkos were forced to vacate their historical land owing to the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

[Stefanowski] That is what is being said or used to be said throughout the postwar period. I wish therefore to emphasize that the Lemkos had not created that army, did not account for most of its members, and thus cannot be accountable for its activities or take credit for them as is being done at present in many circles. Let us add that only a few Lemkos belonged to that army. Some had joined it out of political ambition but others did so owing to coercion. Let us thus say that the UPA has never been, and is not, a Lemko cause. That is so besides for the principal reason that the ideology of the UPA, i.e., Great Ukrainian nationalism, is not, or rather was not 45 years ago, part of the mentality of our ethnic group, a group that has survived and preserved its identity owing to its authentic conservatism. It has never been involved in politics. Even the Germans failed to create "Volkslemkem," although they tried hard. They were more successful with Polish Gorals. This stance, this distancing from politics, has been maintained by the Lemkos throughout their centuries-long history. I would even say that therein consists their instinct for self-preservation.

[Semprich] Do you know how many Lemkos have been deported to the Soviet Union?

[Stefanowski] The assumption is, about 50 to 60 percent. Thus consider that over there they had a traumatic experience—among other things, because the accent in the Lemko language is similar to Polish, being placed on the second syllable from the end. As a result, they stood out quite starkly among the local population. They were even told, "Polachki, what do you want here?" To compound the problem, the farms vacated by Poles were immediately settled by local Ukrainians. Thus, many Lemkos were transported to Greater Ukraine, even as far as the Donbass. Nostalgia for the mountains won out and, whenever possible, they returned to the Carpathians. As a rule, though, they suffered a great deal of misery.

[Semprich] In Poland a majority of the Lemkos live nowadays in the western and northern areas of the

country. They often say that they feel like second-class citizens. Are not they exaggerating?

[Stefanowski] We shall become full citizens of the Polish Republic only after the full truth about Operation "Wis-tula," during which the People's Polish Army deported us from our native lands, is made public. Only when the thievish and criminal decree whereby the state expropriated our very own native lands under the guise of colonizing deserted farms is repealed. As for us we not only did not vacate our lands voluntarily but also were threatened with strict punishments should we try to return."

[Semprich] During that period similar injustices were inflicted on many Poles too. They too were driven out of their homes and deprived of their property. So far they have not received compensation; in many cases reprivatization is not feasible. In such a situation it may be readily concluded that the Lemkos expect of the Polish state more than it is giving to anybody else.

[Stefanowski] The principle of collective responsibility was applied to us alone as an autochthonic people. We were deliberately dispersed, deprived of contact with our own culture, condemned to denationalization. Nowadays that we live dispersed, with several families each in different villages, how can it be possible for us to preserve our indigenous traditions? How many Lemkos are separated from the nearest Greek Catholic or Orthodox church by distances of dozens, if not hundreds, of kilometers? What are the opportunities for a Lemko child to learn in his own mother tongue? We are by no means exaggerating when we say that our civil rights are not respected.

A major misunderstanding that is deeply rooted in the awareness of Poles is that the products of Lemko culture, some artifacts or icons, attract greater respect than the creators of that culture, of those artifacts and icons. We feel this keenly.

[Semprich] Recently a growing number of Lemkos have been returning to Beskid Niski.

[Stefanowski] Not that many. I no longer believe in a mass return, because it is too late, because by now already the third generation of Lemkos is growing up on alien land. But both those who are coming back and those who cannot decide to return to the soil of their ancestors feel responsible for that soil.

[Semprich] That precisely is what the Lemko Citizens Circle is stressing, is it not?

[Stefanowski] We desire to stress our civil rights rather than our ethnic specificity or regional specificity, because these are secondary issues given the present situation of the Polish Republic. After all, we are loyal citizens of the Polish Republic. Our roots are located within its boundaries. And we want to get our civil rights

respected by peaceful means—an approach, I mean the avoidance of conflicts, which is deeply rooted in our mentality.

[Semprich] Is that possible? You speak of your rights as masters of your native soil, but what about the yet another generation of Polish settlers operating former Lemko farms which they had been granted under the land reform, which they accepted in good faith, and, above all, who can in no way be blamed for Operation “Vistula”?

[Stefanowski] That exactly is why we are not demanding the return of these farms to us. The entire philosophy of our movement can be reduced to the belief that one wrong cannot be righted with another. However, we do expect our forests, now state owned, to be returned to us. Their privatization, or rather their transfer to their rightful owners, will not hurt the interests of any present-day inhabitant of the former Lemko region.

[Semprich] Has this idea of desisting from any demand for the return of Lemko farms gained universal acceptance among the Lemko community?

[Stefanowski] Such a return is surely not feasible. Sure, some of my friends accuse me of cooperating with the government on the grounds that I am voluntarily resigning our claims. But I am not alone in this. The supporters of our movement, who altogether number some 12,000, also deliberately desist from such claims, thus stressing the importance which they attach to a conflict-free resolution of problems and a harmonious coexistence with all neighbors—with Boykos, Poles, and Ukrainians. And as regards the forest question we view it as a test case of the attitude of the government toward our community. That is why we even accepted a person's oath of self-immolation in the event that we do not recover that property.

[Semprich] This sounds like a threat. Still, you already scored an initial victory: logging in those forests has been halted.

[Stefanowski] Yes, until June 1991. But the conclusion of this issue is being disturbingly protracted. Thus, people are not only getting impatient but feeling anxious and beginning to doubt the outcome of our efforts. And they had believed so strongly in the young Polish democracy.

[Semprich] Would not the transfer of these forests to private hands threaten their devastation?

[Stefanowski] For centuries the Lemkos have shown great esteem for the forests and taken very good care of them. They were really very good managers. I don't think that the situation will be different now. Besides, the management of such forests has always taken place—and so it should be in the future—under the supervision of forestry authorities. This safeguards against any plunder of these forests.

[Semprich] In what other ways do the Lemkos want to be active in Beskid Niski?

[Stefanowski] We expect that a Polish-Lemko round-table will come about, that we shall cooperate as equal partners with Poles and no one will treat us as intruders. Then the Lemkos will of a certainty involve themselves in promoting the economic recovery of that territory. On one condition, however: namely, that we shall not become a bargaining card in Polish-Ukrainian negotiations, that no one conceives the notion that the Lemkos should be granted exactly as many rights as are granted to Poles living in the Ukraine.

[Semprich] Why? After all, that is the basis of the principle of reciprocity, accepted throughout the civilized world.

[Stefanowski] Because all our interests are focused in Poland. Because many ethnic Ukrainians are put off by our regionalism and do not understand it or perceive it as reflecting separatist tendencies. By the nature of things the Lemkos' aspirations for [becoming part of] the Ukraine are not as strong as, e.g., those of the Ukrainians living near Przemyśl. Your mentality, too, is somewhat different. Thus I see no reason why our rights should be decided in Kiev.

[Semprich] Professor Roman Reinfuss in his recently published book “Sladami Lemkow” [Following the Traces of the Lemkos] characterized even more sharply the relations between Lemkos and ethnic Ukrainians. He even claimed that the former oppose forced Ukrainization.

[Stefanowski] I know the professor and esteem and respect him very highly. As an ethnographer he has accomplished a great deal, more than anybody else, in preserving the culture of the Lemkos from oblivion. But he is making a mistake, and a very fundamental one, too, in involving himself in both national and local politics, as in this case.

[Semprich] One last question: do you maintain contact with the Lemkos living in the USSR? Do they include people who would like to return to land of the Lemko?

[Stefanowski] I know nothing about that, and I personally fear any new resettlements or relocations of the Lemkos. In practice this could mean that “Brother Ukrainian” would behave toward Lemkos just like “Brother Pole.”

That is, I am sure that then, likewise, the Soviet Lemkos would abandon their forests and farms in the USSR and get no compensation for them. But by then that would be a matter for the Ukrainian government, and it is to that government that they would have to address their claims. As for the nostalgia felt by many Lemkos for our mountains, akin to that felt by Poles for Lvov, that is another and quite comprehensible matter. Thus this problem may perhaps be resolved only in a united Europe, once we form a common European family. Then

a Pole will be able to travel to Lvov, and even buy a house there, and a Lemko from the USSR will even be able to travel to Beskid Niski whenever he wishes. He may even settle there permanently, because then frontiers will be only political.

[Semprich] Nowadays this sounds like a fairy tale.

[Stefanowski] I know. But since that is possible in West Europe, why should not it happen too here in our region?

YUGOSLAVIA

Croatian Democratic Party Calls for Independent Army

91BA0104B Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian
13 Oct 90 pp 50-52

[Interview with Dr. Vladimir Veselica, leader of the Croatian Democratic Party; place and date not given: "The Anonymous Croatian Parliament"]

[Text] A fairly restrained and unaggressive politician compared to the other leaders of the HDS [Croatian Democratic Party], a party which he says has about 50,000 members, Dr. Vladimir Veselica has recently moved to the very top of the political interest of the media. Ivan Gabelica, Anto Kovacevic, and Marko Veselica are much harsher in examining the numerous essential aspects of Croatian politics. A sharp split recently threatened the top of the HDS, including removal of President Veselica, but the conflict was "smoothed over" with Vlado Veselica's remark that he will never be "against his brother, even if it means resigning his position."

It is obvious that the HDS, as a party which was born in the factional fights that occurred when the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] was formed, will continue in the future to be a fairly important factor on the Croatian political chessboard. Should there be a significant drop in the prestige and influence of the HDZ, that will make it all the more important.

[START] What is your most important reproach of the administration of the HDZ to this point?

[Veselica] The effective measures which the Croatian public expected from a Croatian government, in keeping with the promises made during the election campaign, have not been forthcoming. It is fully evident that not a finger has been lifted concerning an entire range of economic topics, social topics, and other areas essential to conducting an effective policy. Emphasis has been put on the features of the state, and too little attention has been devoted to these topics, and tensions in society have occurred as a consequence. We expected that the Croatian government would have a consistent economic program, since we do not accept the thesis that the program of the federal government is at the same time the program of the Croatian government. It is impossible for those programs to be identical, since the parameters

of the Croatian economy are different, since Croatia's economic position differs essentially from the economic position of the other republics. If we are all agreed that Croatia is economically and politically sovereign, then it must also conduct its own economic policy. No reason has been given as to why there have been no activities in the economic and social sphere, and a serious debate of this is anticipated in the Croatian Assembly. The collapse of the economy in Croatia is quite evident. More than 52 percent of the workers are in enterprises operating at a loss, there is no clear conception of reprivatization and restructuring the Croatian economy, and misery and poverty are spreading more and more. We cannot allow disintegration in the economy, the creation of hundreds of thousands of unemployed, since social tensions would then occur that would threaten everything that has been achieved up to this point.

[START] Do you agree that for all the increasing frequent assertions of the opposition that we still do not live in a democracy, that we have, as Vlado Gotovac says, freedom, but that we are still far from democracy?

[Veselica] We are only at the beginning of establishing a modern democracy. One senses that the expectations regarding democratic prospects have not yet been realized. Only the political sphere has undergone change. The entire economic sphere has gone untouched, including personnel appointed on the principle of moral and political fitness. It is my opinion and the position of the HDS that the political parties have no business in the economy, that they have no business in the institutions, and that the problem of personnel should be solved with public competitions. But an unforeseen alliance has occurred between the HDZ and the SDP, since all other Croatian parties have been neglected in the combinations of names that have been mentioned. The result of all this is the fact that the Croatian government itself does not represent a quality Croatian selection.

[START] And what do you think about the arguments that the HDZ has monopolized the public in the same way as the Communists did until recently?

[Veselica] There are significant trends toward establishing the mechanism of censorship, affecting television and radio most of all. If that kind of censorship should actually be established, this would be a decline of democracy. It is not easy to get free of the syndrome of indoctrination related to the ideology which enslaved us for many long years, and it is not unusual for that syndrome of indoctrination to occur under new circumstances as well. The methodology of government is being copied in a certain sense, and that is not a good thing.

[START] Have you personally, or your party, had a specific encounter with this newfound censorship?

[Veselica] I can say that the news media have been quite tolerant toward us, that we have been given significant space in the press. It is a fact, however, that the HDZ has been receiving far larger space. The opposition parties are now in a new position which they must examine

seriously. But the newspapers, in becoming independent, are also moving into an essential new position. That tendency toward censorship is still almost invisible, but it can still be felt.

[START] Is a new moral and political fitness actually being devised?

[Veselica] It is unacceptable, for example, that the HDZ intervene in selection of personnel in the economy. No party should be allowed to do this. Party membership must not bring any privilege whatsoever. Otherwise, we will end up with political exclusiveness, political monism, which would signify the debacle of democracy in Croatia.

[START] Is the reason for this situation the alleged Bolshevik matrix on which the HDZ was born?

[Veselica] No, I think that is not the case. The HDZ was born in the framework of changes in civilization and political changes in Europe. The Croatian Democratic Community made the best use of the situation and turned itself into an all-Croat movement. That attribute applies even today. We in Croatia still do not have any modern political party. The coefficient of party politicization in Croatia is terribly high, more than 30 percent, whereas in Germany that coefficient is only 2 percent.

[START] Are not these reproaches of the ruling party, which are based on denying space in the newspapers and on insufficient democratization, actually identical to the reproaches which the opposition addressed to the Communists?

[Veselica] It still cannot be said that the analogy holds between the HDZ and the Communists. The Communists held all the instruments of power beyond any control. The HDZ does not possess that, nor could it, although the tendency exists for the HDZ to take control in all spheres. We are against having all the important posts held exclusively by members of the ruling party.... The opposition anticipated that the party in power would devote more attention to party life in Croatia, that the problem of the financial status of political organizations would be resolved, that all the parties would take part in the selection of personnel. The HDZ cannot solve Croatia's problems alone. There are more and more reasons to set up the Croatian government differently. As some people say, it is time for a national rescue government, although that expression has been profaned to some extent. There was reason to anticipate that the party that won the election as the spokesman of democracy would do much more in democratic breakthroughs than the party that held power without legitimacy for 45 years. Unfortunately, the HDZ has answered those expectations only in part.

[START] All of that may be so. However, it seems to us that the problem lies elsewhere. That is, aside from these conventional reproaches to which we have become

accustomed, the opposition is not actually doing anything. Why does the opposition not offer to the public a number of specific counterproposals related to certain actions of the government?

[Veselica] There are no prerequisites whatsoever for the opposition to seriously oppose the HDZ in the sense of authentic parliamentary democracy. The parliamentary features which Croatia has are very rudimentary. Aside from the HDZ, we have in the Parliament only the SDP and the HDS with its 12 deputies. All the other parties have one or two deputies. The very way in which the Croatian Assembly operates prevents complete installation of parliamentary democracy, since the views of the leaders of the Assembly are still dominant; debate is often lacking because of the time limitation, five or 10 minutes, which does not allow for serious debate of any problem. What is more, the Croatian parties are still preoccupied with the election results, they do not have the financial prerequisites for their activity, they do not have real organs of their own, they do not have appropriate representation in opstinas, nor in the Assembly. For all these reasons, they cannot in fact be more effective than they are, so that all of that is a voice crying in the political wilderness, not any serious political activity. I would not like for the parties to mechanically oppose the HDZ out of habit, but rather would like them to have a critical position on each individual problem. To welcome what is good for Croatia and to demand that what is no good be changed. I hope that that kind of practice will slowly be established, that the parties will bring forth their own political projects. We might expect some of the Croatian parties to offer even a parallel Croatian constitution. If the parties are to be able to function in that way, they must have financial prerequisites and prerequisites concerning their status. Amateurism in politics can function only to a certain point.

[START] Nevertheless, aside from the Law Party, not a single other Croatian party has taken a clear stand even in connection with such an important document as the confederal treaty.

[Veselica] The Croatian Democratic Party has taken a position. We feel that Croatia must become an independent state, since Yugoslavia has proven to be an unsuitable solution for the nationalities living in it. A confederation can exist as a transitional model because of the complexity of the problems in which we find ourselves and because of failure to understand the problems of Yugoslavia as a polyvalent and multinational structure, which is no longer an imperative for us. On the contrary, the concept of a number of independent states is proving to be increasingly realistic. Incidentally, all the other Croatian parties also advocate the concept of an independent Croatian state. To achieve a confederation, the republics have to be independent to some degree, which means that there no longer is even a constitution that would be legally binding on us. After all, a confederation does not have a constitution.

[START] Does the independent Croatia cover its present territory, or is the reference to something broader?

[Veselica] It is my opinion that Croatia should respect present borders. They can be changed only by the political will of the people living in various regions. It is a fact that Croatia is geopolitically, historically, and ethnically bound up with Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is certain that the status of Bosnia is a crucial issue, not only for Croatia and Bosnia, but for all the others as well. My position is that Bosnia ought to be independent and that the nationalities in it should decide what kind of ties they want to maintain with the other countries. It is certain that the disintegration of Yugoslavia implies the question of whether all the republics will remain in the present borders. The position of Croatia toward Bosnia and Herzegovina should range within the limits of political reality, and all the historical and ethnic facts should be respected. It is natural that economic and all other ties between Croatia and Bosnia should be intensified, but only the people living in Bosnia can decide what form their governmental ties will take.

[START] But why, then, talk at all about Croatia on the Drina? What would that get Croatia except a number of new hotbeds like the one in Knin?

[Veselica] I agree, but if the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina want to live in a state they share with Croatia, this would be an ethnically complex entity that would have to be regulated like a federal state in which Croats would represent slightly more than 50 percent. But in setting up a state the geopolitical factor is also essential along with the ethnic factor. For example, all the north-south transportation routes cross Bosnia, which implies intensive cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, independently of the character of the governmental community.

[START] And how do you look on the increasingly frequent Serbian encroachments in the direction of Bosnia?

[Veselica] It is a fact that a high percentage of Serbs live in Bosnia. It is also a fact, however, that Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the exception of a very short period, were never within the Serbian state. The Drina was always the boundary, both natural and national. Both political and economic flows have always oriented Bosnia and Herzegovina toward a linkage with Croatia. I emphasize once again that the political will of the people living in Bosnia is essential.

[START] But since it is not a question of a people's determination, but of an attempt to realize Serbian interests by force, as in Foca, how should Croatia react?

[Veselica] Those events are the consequence of the imperialist outlook of Serbian expansionism, which is not of recent date. That outlook, which was characteristic both of Nikola Pasic and Pera Zivkovic, and also the postwar Serbian politicians who have tended toward centralization of Yugoslavia, is contrary to the interests

of the Serbian people since no one any longer wants to live in the same governmental community with that people; Serbia has come into conflict with everyone around it. Should that outlook be realized in Bosnia, Croatia must react determinedly if only to protect the Croatian people living there. It is also obvious that the Muslim politicians do not want Bosnia-Herzegovina to become a part of an expanded Serbia either. Annexation of Bosnia by Serbia would bring Serbia closer to Croatia, which would represent a great danger to Croatia.

[START] Has the Croatian position in negotiations concerning the split been considerably weakened by its lack of a Croatian armed force?

[Veselica] My position is that a people cannot be sovereign unless it is sovereign in terms of the economy, politics, the military, and the police. At present, Croatia does not have any of those attributes. It now turns out that Croatia cannot be defended with federal institutions. Croatia must be capable of defending itself on its own! If it does not manage that, then it will fail. Croatia must strive for its own armed force, similar to the conception in the Slovenian Constitution. Even in the confederal system Croatia should have an independent army. Not directed against anyone, but in order to preserve its territory and political system. Many people are horrified when a Croatian army is mentioned. But even Ban Jelacic had a Croatian army.

[START] How would the HDS behave if it were in power?

[Veselica] The Croatian Democratic Party would pursue a different methodology. As for the insignia of the state, the anthem, the spoken and written languages, our behavior would be similar to that of the HDZ. Those matters are not in dispute, the people took a position on them in the elections and in the election campaign. Perhaps the way in which those changes were carried out has been inconsistent. So that now we have come to a strange situation. We deputies in the Assembly have raised a Croatian flag on which the crest began with a white square—the crest begins that way in almost all the flags—and now Dr. Tudjman has announced that the first square will be red, which astounded both the Croats in America and the public here. The HDS would take a more economical and modern position toward the state bureaucracy, but it would establish institutions that would aid the development we are looking for. If we came to power, we would immediately present our economic program, an elaborate social welfare policy, we would try to translate the commitments in the election campaign into reality. Perhaps in the election campaign we were too realistic, but on the other hand we are now more attractive, since the people are waiting for the promises to be fulfilled.

[START] And how would the HDS react to the events in Knin or Petrinja?

[Veselica] Our assessment is that it would be good if in the end there is no use of firearms. We are aware that

Serbian expansionist circles would like to set the Croats and Serbs at odds. But the question is whether Croatia can defend itself. Events of this kind will recur day after day, since the Serbian expansionist circles do not accept a Croatian state of any kind. That is why the Croatian government must at any price, even at the price of partial mobilization of the population, guarantee tranquil life and free passage on highways and railroads. If it does not achieve that, if banditry is legalized, then the Croatian state itself is in jeopardy. If the dispute cannot be resolved in negotiations, and essential issues are involved such as taking away Croatian territory, then there is no question that additional measures should be pursued, including mobilization.

[START] What is your understanding of mobilization when Croatia does not have its own army?

[Veselica] Croatia has its police and territorial defense, and if it is threatened, then it should use every means at its disposal. Since the Yugoslav People's Army cannot be brought in, since that would signify a catastrophe, Croatia should use that force accessible to it, not in order to shoot on Serbs, but in order to preserve the peace. Precisely because in the concept of the independent Croatian state Serbs no longer have an opportunity to behave as an instrument of Serbian expansionist policy, the HDS is against a confederation and in favor of an independent Croatia. In that case, Croatian Serbs would have to behave in conformity with the laws of the state in which they live. It is interesting to mention that judging by all accessible information, those Serbs who say that they are threatened actually do not know what is threatening them, they are unable to mention anything specific.

[START] Let us move on to economic problems. It is obvious that the government has done nothing important to improve Croatia's economic position. Does the opposition have any specific proposals or specific solutions?

[Veselica] I would repeat once again that it is an illusion to think that the program of the federal government can also be the program of the Croatian government. This is impossible, if for no other reason than because Markovic's program is based on a distributive economy, and because that precisely reflects all the problems Yugoslavia faces. It is imperative that Croatia come forth with its own economic program expressing the structure of the Croatian economy. We should aim at a restructuring of the Croatian economy, at a kind of New Deal that would stimulate processes of prosperity. Since the Croatian government still has not offered an economic program, we have decided to present our program to the public.

[START] On what is the Croatian New Deal based?

[Veselica] It is based on several premises. The first premise is that Croatia be politically and economically sovereign, which means that Croatia would possess all its natural resources, social wealth, and all of the creative value. This means that there would no longer be the

Fund for the Underdeveloped, that the measures to consolidate the banks and the economy of the underdeveloped republics would be rescinded.... We are talking about a whole range of measures used to feed the federal budget, whose share in the social product of Yugoslavia is 15 percent. The Croatian New Deal assumes that Croatia can be a prosperous country. It has absolute and relative comparative advantages over many European countries. As a typically maritime country, it has all the prerequisites for tourism, but tourism conceived as something with connections to many other things. Even at present Croatia has a share of 2 percent in world tourist traffic. We could have a share of 5 percent. Our entire conception of the Croatian economy must be based on a model of the economics of beauty. That is why we attribute particular importance to the environment. To go further, even today Croatia produces 10 percent of the output of world shipbuilding. Croatia's maritime orientation should embrace the entire territory of Croatia, and better transportation connections are a prerequisite for the maritime orientation. The priority route should be Karlovac-Rijeka, and this should not be some semisuperhighway, but a true superhighway. The second most important route is Karlovac-Split. We favor building a Zagreb-Rijeka railroad through the plains. The Croatian New Deal also assumes that Croatia has important prerequisites for development of the agro-complex, for the production of wholesome food. Finally, there is also an industrial core which could be on a world level. Whatever is not good should disappear from the economic stage. Another essential prerequisite for development is the fact that Croatia can invest between \$8 and \$10 billion a year, which would result in a growth rate of the social product of 11 percent annually. This would make it possible for Croatia to solve its elementary problems in five years, which means employing 156,000 unemployed people and giving productive employment to several hundred thousand people we now list as technologically redundant; the concept of the HDS is oriented toward creation of full employment. There would, of course, be unemployed even afterward, but they would be a kind of parameter and would have an altogether different meaning than we usually give to them. In 15 to 18 years, Croatia could reach the standard of living of the countries of Western Europe, and in 25 years the level of development of the countries of Western Europe. We had a similar concept back in 1971, when many people attacked us for advocating a Croatian economic miracle.

[START] How would that kind of development be financed? Where do those \$10 billion a year come from?

[Veselica] Some of those funds would come from our own accumulation and depreciation; sizable resources should be created through reprivatization. Croatian social capital is worth about \$90 billion, and it could be an instrument for development through which additional resources could be created. And then Croatia has appreciable personal foreign exchange savings. If a market for capital were created, a securities market, that

savings would also become a factor for development as it is in up-to-date market economies. The linkage between the Croatian emigre community and the homeland makes it possible for a large number of our citizens to invest capital. A process of repatriation could be initiated with that model. All the figures show that Croatia is the most attractive of all the Yugoslav republics for investment of foreign capital on the principle of rapid return. Of course, the system for allocation of those investments must be a market system. That kind of Croatia would become a modern and prosperous state in which Zagreb would be a typical maritime city that would be only two hours from the sea, thanks to construction of modern roads and the railroad through the plains to Rijeka. In the Austro-Hungarian period, Croatia was only 15 percent less developed than Austria and 10 percent less than Hungary. Today, Austria has a per capita social product of \$12,000, and Croatia \$3,000. Switzerland has more than \$18,000, and Croatian resources are better than those of the Swiss. What we particularly reproach the Croatian government for is the absence of measures to protect Croatian space.

[START] To what are you referring?

[Veselica] I am referring to the devastation of Croatian space, especially the Adriatic coast. Systematic colonization is under way and is changing the ethnic pattern of the population. In a sense, Croatia is becoming a country of immigrants, while at the same time it is a country of emigrants. If this process continues in the future, that would be disastrous.

[START] What should the government specifically undertake?

[Veselica] The government should undertake specific measures, including nationalization of areas taken away by people who had no right to do so. Kilometers of our coast are being used without any compensation whatsoever. All kinds of resorts and weekend cottages have been built, and Croatia does not even collect rent on all that, although naturally it is entitled to it. We are now undertaking a campaign to prevent destruction of the old heart of the city in Umag. A thousand lots in that area were given away, mostly in Belgrade. We feel that concessions should not be given even to foreign capital. The Spaniards, for example, regretted having given away a part of their coast to foreigners.

[START] What would be your comment on the dispute between Dr. Kalogjera and Dr. Babic in connection with reprivatization of social property?

[Veselica] I think that that dispute is secondary, that the real reasons for changes in the government go deeper, above all a differing view of the economic system and its functioning. Those differences are understandable, since we still do not have a formula for how certain ideas are going to be implemented, and that is perhaps the fault of the personnel making up the Croatian government and other important institutions which do not have either the people who can theoretically conceive the program nor

the people who can implement it in practice. Implementation is very important in politics, and that is the problem in our country, since these people have done very little practical work. If we are to speak specifically about reprivatization, we must face the fact that even world-class experts do not understand this problem. If one is going to have to choose between Kalogjera and Babic, I am against monopoly of the state, and for that reason Mato Babic's conception is preferable.

[START] But Babic is also being accused of statism.

[Veselica] Yes, but as I understand it, that involved a substitution of arguments. In any case, the concept of state ownership is not acceptable, and this has been proven in practice. In the HDS, we feel that the process of reprivatization must last between five and 10 years, that we should aim at private ownership, cooperative ownership, public ownership, and mixed ownership. Reprivatization must not be carried out in an uncontrolled way. After all, the social capital which Croatia possesses, and it is worth about \$90 million, should become the basis for Croatia's development. It can be privatized only by means of effective shares, not so-called internal shares. The system of internal shares is a bit syndicalist in nature and contains the Samaritan principle. Capital has its logic and behavior, work has its logic and behavior, and the worker need not be a coowner in the enterprise in order to be motivated to work. Social capital ought not to be sold off cheap to foreign partners, although the methods of assessing the value of that capital are very complicated. It is my opinion that social capital should be a specific item on balance sheets; one part could be reprivatized, and one part could always remain "anonymous" capital, which would have an induced effect on the global profitability of those enterprises. No one could become the owner of an enterprise without effective capital. Moreover, it is also essential to take a psychological step. We are all still burdened with social welfare, which has not had the social impact that was desired.... It is essential to say that the processes of reprivatization are specific. As for housing, we propose that the right of tenancy be turned into a credit relationship. Put simply, the individual makes payments, resources build up for new housing construction, and construction crews are put to work.... Free disbursed capital can be assembled in the economy by issuing shares, again there is an accumulation of resources and new investments and development. I emphasize once again that the problem in Croatia is not capital—there will be capital, both domestic and foreign. The essential question is, of course, political security. If a war is imposed on us, none of this is going to happen. But if Croatia is politically secure and independent, it can become very prosperous.

[START] When people talk about Croatian economic sovereignty, they mention a Croatian currency more and more frequently. What is the position of the HDS on "Croatian money"?

[Veselica] A mystery is made of this question unnecessarily. Every people which has its own state also has its own currency. Our peoples had their own currency even in the past. The Croatian currency would not be an obstacle to establishing normal economic cooperation, the free circulation of capital and goods among the Yugoslav republics. A national currency is an attribute of sovereignty, and it would prevent speculation related to the central bank, the federal bank that issues money.

[START] The political public here is aware of the conflict in the Croatian Democratic Party. What is the cause of the conflict, the difference over Bosnia or the attempt to remove you?

[Veselica] Even in the HDS there are many differing political opinions, there are people who talk differently, who are inclined to a more radical expression of certain political views. In a recent meeting of the party's executive committee, positions were nevertheless reconciled, and as for Bosnia, they were resolved in such a way that one can no longer speak about a split. As for my position as president, that will be debated in the Assembly of the HDS on 1 and 2 December.

[START] You have declared that by no means can you accept a situation in which your brother and you are political rivals. Yet now you have arrived at such a situation.

[Veselica] Marko and I are so similar in some things, we have gone through so many things together and are bound together by so many things that I really think it would be difficult for us to be opposing candidates. His destiny has, of course, been much more difficult than mine.... This situation has come about because of some of his supporters, who perhaps have been overzealous in pushing his candidacy for presidency of the HDS.

[START] When you confronted the demand of the North American chapters, which was much like an ultimatum, that you resign, did you think about becoming politically involved in some other party?

[Veselica] No, I am not a man who changes parties like his shirts. In the HDS, I can remain even as an ordinary party member, and as such I will have my duties and will take part in the work of the party.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Overview of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe

91CH0167A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
7 Nov 90 pp 1, 8

[Article by Karoly Csabai: "For the Time Being, Hungary Continues To Be the Favorite"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] During the next five years, the world's big multinational firms will want to invest at least \$3 billion in East European joint companies, primarily in Hungary, and in the former German Democratic Republic. According to a study which summarizes the intentions of 28 big companies, European firms are more interested than their Japanese or American partners in investment opportunities in East Europe. Far Eastern companies are much more cautious, and one probably should not count on more active participation on their part in the near future. On the other hand, those few Japanese firms which have concrete plans are preparing for relatively large investments.

According to the data of the German Economic Institute, about 250 joint East-West companies are being formed each month at present. During this year, the amount of investment capital from developed countries (OECD region) increased by \$2 billion, to a total of \$3.4 billion. However, this increase affected only the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Because of increasing political uncertainties, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria were completely bypassed by Western capital.

West Europeans pay a lot of attention to Hungary. German experts' explanation for this is that Hungary's regulations present much fewer obstacles for the operation of joint companies than those of the other East European countries. According to others, however, there are still too many stumbling blocks in Hungary. German representatives of joint ventures think Hungarian investments are rather unfavorable because of unsuitable economic and legal conditions.

Nonetheless, Hungary's legal framework for investment and privatization is the most efficient among East European countries. The German experts recognize that Hungary's privatization creates new investment opportunities.

Hungary's private sector is the largest in East Europe, producing 15 percent of gross domestic production. At the same time, the network of commercial banks, created four years ago, is still being further developed. This is perhaps the reason that some large foreign financial groups (e.g., the Paribas of France) think of making Hungary the center of the planned Central European network of commercial banks.

Of course, despite the favorable assessment abroad, one must not forget that Hungary is facing a major crisis. No

infrastructure has yet been developed in Hungary, the authorities are indifferent, and Hungarian workers are still unperceiving of Western requirements. In the long term, one must expect that West European investors will acquire significant shares in other East European countries as well.

Today, foreigners may legally buy even an entire domestic company in every East European country except the Soviet Union. Indeed, certain conditions for capital investment are more favorable in the neighboring countries than in Hungary. While the authorization of a purchase of part or 100 percent of a company takes three months in Hungary, the processing of applications requires "only" two months in Poland and Czechoslovakia, for instance.

Profits may be freely transferred abroad in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, however, foreigners must offer part of their earnings to the state bank, and in Poland, too, the use of profits is limited.

The tax laws related to foreign investments also differ. In Bulgaria, there is a five year tax exemption in the free trade zones, and only a 20-percent tax must be paid after that. The Polish Government may even authorize a six-year tax exemption in case of an investment that is beneficial to the economy. In Czechoslovakia, the maximum term of tax exemption for foreigners is two years. In Hungary, a five-year tax exemption is granted when a joint company conducts its activity in a specified sector.

On the other hand, there is no difference in that joint companies may introduce, in practically all countries and without having to pay duties, raw materials and equipment needed by production for exports.

At present, it is still Hungary that stands in the center of foreign investors' interest. Our relative advantage over other East European countries has already decreased somewhat during the past months, and will probably disappear in a few years. This is the time during which the government must create all the conditions that will continue to make Hungary attractive to foreign firms.

HUNGARY

New Minimum Wage Analyzed

91CH0141A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 8 Sep 90 p 18

[Article by Ibolya Jakus: "Still Not Enough"]

[Text] The minimum wage of 5,600 forints, payment of which will be mandatory starting in September, is approximately half of the gross average wage and 60 percent of the new average wage. It exceeds the officially registered subsistence wage, and comes within a hair of the unofficial subsistence wage. The only small note to add is that, after the employee bonus has been deducted from this amount, the remainder is higher than the upper limit on the tax-free income bracket by only 200 forints

annually—and therefore it even is subject to taxation. Today, for 5,600 forints, four pairs of medium-quality, out-of-style shoes or 20 kilos of pork chops can be purchased. This amount could cover the average upkeep on an average residence for two months—though it's true that the same amount would hardly finance market-rate-interest mortgage installments on an average residence. As many conclusions can be drawn as comparisons made from these numbers, but their entirety represents a true reflection of the striking contradictions in the domestic wage system.

And the most appalling one is that the minimum wage increase affects about 1.2 million workers. In other words, up to 1 September more than a quarter of those working were earning less than 5,600 forints, which corresponds to an hourly wage of 31 forints. And the situation is hardly helped by the view often put forward in social policy circles that wages actually received in Hungary greatly exceed the basic wage because of the variety of allowances, bonuses, and premiums. Because, according to the data from the tax office, in March of this year 904 thousand people did not pay income tax; in other words, their income was below that ominous 5,600 forints a month. Therefore, since there is nationally a real gap between wages and incomes, there is really all the less for the lowest level breadwinners: It is precisely this class that can expect the smallest premiums that are wage related in nature, and as their professions are the least respected socially, it is very probable that they cannot supplement their incomes significantly in the second economy either.

Half of those earning the minimum wage work at economic organizations outside of agriculture, we learned from Janos Ori, who works at the Ministry of Labor. In numbers this means 590 thousand people, who comprise 23 percent of those employed in the enterprise sphere. Most of them are engaged in light industry, commerce, transport, and the building materials industry. It can be conjectured that the largest contingent among these people are those who knowingly work for a depressed basic wage in the hope of getting a premium or a gratuity following high [customer or product] turnover. In making a judgment on their case, one must take the wage usually achieved in a normative (100-percent) production level, and not the base wage, as the minimum achievable wage. If this is higher, we learned from Janos Ori, than the wage minimum now established, then supplementation of the basic wage will not necessarily take place.

Up to the present, half the workers in agriculture, 350 thousand people, received fewer than 5,600 forints. The wage increase in this sphere is mandatorily binding only for the employees; for the members of the cooperative, who are simultaneously owners as well, the regulation has no compulsory force, Janos Ori says. But he adds that in his opinion it can hardly be imagined that at a TEESZ [production cooperative], pay for employees would be raised to a degree such that pay for members in the meantime would remain below the minimum. The

basic wage is less than 5,600 forints for "only" one out of five—for a total of 240,000—employees at publicly financed institutions. Most of them are working in health services and teaching and at public education institutions. While in the enterprise and agricultural sphere it is mainly the ranks of the unskilled and semiskilled workers that produce those earning less than the minimum wage, many in the same category in the publicly financed sphere are qualified members of the workforce, not infrequently doctors, nurses, pharmacists, professors, elementary school teachers, nursery school teachers, and librarians, with degrees. While there are no definite data for these people, the nature of the professions mentioned can lead one to conclude that the large portion of those bringing home the minimum wage is increasing.

Starting in September payment of the minimum wage to all workers is mandatory, aside from the few categories listed. Publicly financed institutions get the 500 million forints needed for the wage hike from state coffers and/or from social insurance, and the enterprises of course must come up with the needed money themselves. If the minimum wage hike boosts wage costs for the enterprise by at least 3 percent, the otherwise customary "punitive tax" need not be paid following the growth in wages and this will be the only relief for the enterprise. However, the fear is that numerous enterprises will have difficulty satisfying their wage-hike obligations even in spite of the "break." The stand being taken by the Interests Mediation Council is that these firms be required to publicly report this fact [of a wage fund shortage] by 30 September so that "the workers and those representing the interests may, after reexamination of the internal wage-payment system, seek the proper solution."

Even this plan for a solution highlights the danger that some firms will be forced to carry out the minimum-wage increase possibly at the expense of the remaining workers. Janos Ori points this out, too. "In the past minimum wage was a very neglected area," he says, "but in the last two years, even acknowledging that its real value may have decreased, it grew at a rate far exceeding [that of] the nominal average wage. On the other hand, this difference in growth may even out the wages of those people who earn totals somewhat above the constant minimum, although growth in these totals has been much more moderate in scope." This contradiction will, on the other hand, still affect those earning less than minimum wage. Conceivably, pay will increase to 5,600 forints equally for those who, let's say, were earning below 5,000 forints—they may number 700,000—as for those who were only 100 forints below the magic number, regardless of performance, qualifications, or other circumstances.

And the minimum wage now introduced is not the smallest remuneration in Hungary, either. More than three-quarters of the 2 million retirees receive less than this, and smaller numbers are awarded unemployment assistance and the minimum GYED [child care fee]—which by definition will be an amount under the wage

minimum. And if we also include the children who belong to the adults involved, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that almost half of the 10 million

Hungarians have subsistence worries that are "associable" with the monthly 5,600 forints.

Minimal Wage Trend, 1988-90

| Date | | Minimum Wage, Forints/Month | Size of Growth Above Previous Year | Average Wage Increase | Consumer Price Index [Above] Same Period [Previous Year] | Subsistence Minimum, Forints/Month | Net Minimum Wage as Percent of Subsistence Minimum |
|------|---------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| | | | | Percent | | | |
| 1988 | | 3,000 | 50 | 9.8 | 15.7 | 3,310 | 81.6 |
| 1989 | Jan-Mar | 3,000 | | | | | |
| | Mar-Oct | 3,700 | | | | | |
| | Oct- | 4,000 | | | | | |
| | Average | 3,660 | 22 | 17.8 | 17.0 | 3,940 | 83.6 |
| 1990 | -Feb | 4,000 | | | | | |
| | Feb-Sep | 4,800 | | 1st half yr | Jan-Apr | | |
| | Sep- | 5,600 | 37 | 24.1 | 25.7 | 5,689* | 87.7* |
| | Average | 5,000 | | | | | |

*Based on data calculated for July 1990 by the Ujpest Family Assistance Center.

Source: Ministry of Labor

POLAND

Dutch Firm To Market Polish Products

91EP0100C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 24 Oct 90 p III

[Article by A.Z.: "Dutch Locomotive"]

[Text] I met Mr. W. M. Zipser, head of the Nederlandse Handelscompagnie Rotterdam, during the "Inbud '90" Fair. Mr. Zipser's company, which has an agency in Poland, has no intention of limiting operations to conducting business in our country alone. He also plans to promote Polish construction companies in the Netherlands. He sees his firm as a special type of locomotive that will lead representatives of other companies to Poland.

The director of the Nederlandse Handelscompagnie Rotterdam says: "I've already managed to hitch two cars up to this engine. I've already shown at fairs some heating systems of the Dinger Onderhoudsbedrijf Dordrecht company, which produces energy-saving furnaces for central heating, as well as economical gas, water, and sewer systems." The next "car" will be a declaration from a group of the largest Benelux firms that want to enter into coproduction with Polish companies and enterprises in the construction area.

There is still one other, subsidiary, "car", which he considers his greatest success in the Netherlands. In the very next few days, literally, we, along with the National Construction Information Center in Warsaw, will be

setting up a Polish agency right in downtown Amsterdam to promote construction firms. Numerous French, Belgian, and German enterprises interested in cooperating with Polish firms both in Poland and on third markets have shown interest in the agency.

Rise in Rural Unemployment Rates Seen

91EP0101A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 24 Oct 90 p III

[Article by Edmund Szot: "An Involuntary Return to the Village—What To Do, What To Live On"]

[Text] "Why worry, why be sad? You come from the countryside. You return to the countryside," the inhabitants of worker hostels in the more industrialized regions of this country used to joke for years. The joke is over and the return to the countryside has already become a fact to some and will become that to many others in the near future. Such are and shall be the consequences of the economic recession, the economic restructuring, and the dissolution of the so-called declining industries, which largely employ rural migrants.

In the years 1950-88, Poland's population grew to 37,862,000 from 25,008,000. During the same period rural population declined to 14,648,000 from 15,009,000. Those who remained on the land for the most part also derived their living from nonfarm occupations. The index of the proportion of farm population to rural population ranges from 20 to 80 percent, and averages 40 percent.

During all the above years it was chiefly young and educated people who had emigrated from the countryside. The so-called old-age index, that is the percentage of rural population having the age of 60 and more, is higher in the country than in the town. Another trend is the so-called defeminization of farm occupations: in some of this country's regions only every third young farmer has a chance to find a wife. Fairly balanced population ratios exist only in the villages situated on areas that offer possibilities for nonfarm employment.

In the next few years major changes will take place in the process of rural depopulation. They will be prompted by the already rising rural unemployment whose causes originate chiefly, however, outside agriculture.

First of all the number of unemployed will be augmented by the so-called peasants-workers, laid off by enterprises and institutions which will curtail their workforces. The number of the peasants with nonfarm incomes is estimated at 2.4 million. It is expected that 10-15 percent of that group will lose their jobs, and of these about 200,000 to 250,000 will seek farm employment. The largest number of layoffs is expected in the Katowice and Kielce voivodships (about 15,000 layoffs each); followed by the Bielsko-Biala and Rzeszow voivodships (11,000 layoffs each); and the Krakow, Nowy Sacz, and Krosno voivodships (9,000 to 10,000 layoffs each).

The second group of the rural jobless will be the graduates of agricultural schools. It is estimated that 50,000 to 70,000 young people, of whom 1,550 with higher educational background, about 13,600 with secondary educational background, and about as many with vocational training, will seek rural employment. The remainder of will be graduates of other kinds of schools who are unable to find urban employment.

A third group of the jobless will be formed by persons laid off by state farms, agricultural producer cooperatives, machinery and tractor stations, agricultural circles, and rural manufacturing and merchandising entities. The size of that third group is estimated at 50,000 persons.

The increase in the number of individuals seeking permanent rural jobs will manifest itself in two stages. During the first stage they will be persons laid off by various entities and during the second, which will arise only a few years hence, they will be persons laid off as a result of the adaptation of farming to the laws of the market economy. The principal cause of unemployment will then be a rise in labor productivity, and thus heretofore concealed unemployment will reveal itself. For while during the first stage the unemployment rate will be more or less uniform throughout the country, during the second it will be higher in such voivodships as Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa, Kielce, Katowice, Piotrkow

Trybunalski, Radom, and Sieradz, where the weaker infrastructure will obstruct the absorption of surplus manpower.

Summing up, rural unemployment for this year is estimated at 350,000 to 400,000 or 20-30 percent of total national unemployment. But in, e.g., the northwestern voivodships this indicator will amount to 10 percent, whereas in Siedlce Voivodship it will reach 50 percent. It depends on, among other things, the proportion of rural population. In reality, though, the proportion of rural unemployment will be higher, because statistics do not include employment in private farming.

What will be the consequences of rural unemployment? Well, a substantial number of people may be left without practically any means of support. The marketability of farm output will decline, and at the same time a black rural market in trade and services will arise. Rural crime rate may increase.

Unless measures to counteract these occurrences are taken, farm efficiency and labor productivity cannot be expected to rise for a long time.

The assumptions of the government's farm policy are such that it is not expected to markedly influence farm employment, especially for the next few years. In this connection, it is expected that during those years the growth rate of farm output will be no higher than one or two percent annually and the average farm size will not change markedly (with the exception of the regions with a large proportion of state farms). On the other hand, interesting changes are forecast as regards production structure and agricultural-engineering and breeding operations: They are expected to stress labor-intensiveness (!) (chemical operations will be replaced with biological and [bio]chemical ones), but the increased mechanization of labor will make possible a gradual rise in output.

"Farm policy will thus counteract rural and farm unemployment," rejoice the authors of a ministry assessment study of that subject, although, truth to say, there is little to rejoice about. Next, they claim:

"Improvements in farm labor effectiveness will occur in proportion to improvements in rural living and working conditions."

In my opinion, here it is the converse that also applies.

In one way or another, it appears that for some time the material situation of the farm population will be difficult, and therefore the effects of rural unemployment must be counteracted. Among other things, this can be done by organizing special work projects (land reclamation, construction of water supply and sewage systems, road construction, afforestation, etc.). Also needed is the provision of vocational counseling for rural youth as well as "increasing the mobility of the rural population, especially of young people, so as to make possible the settlement of the depopulated regions."

This last sentence is taken from the abovementioned assessment study. Let me note in this connection that perhaps now, owing to the press of the difficult material conditions, people will accept this idea, because the related experience so far has been highly discouraging. Undoubtedly, though, the question of settlement cannot be resolved without financial support.

It will also be necessary to locate some source of funding the so-called work projects. Projects of this kind had been organized before the war even by some big landlords, thus providing employment to the then huge army of the jobless. Lastly, in the countryside there exists a genuine need for all kinds of services, and there is room for the expansion of the processing industry, for private practice by physicians and veterinarians, for lawyers, for organizers of cultural activities, etc. However, the commencement of activities of this kind requires prior investment of resources. Preferential loans seem to be the best form of sponsoring initiatives of this kind.

Essentially, it is not that there is nothing to do in the Polish countryside. It may turn out, however, that there is no funding for the needed investments. A relatively unproductive agriculture may prove to be a too shallow market for services. The point is to intensify the division of labor in the rural areas, for in every community the division of labor proves to be a motive power of increase in labor productivity. To be sure, the present recession is indeed hardly the best time for demonstrating this axiom.

Unemployment Benefit Changes Planned

91EP0100A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 27-28 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Krzysztof Bien: "Controversy Over the Scope of Benefits: Who's To Be Qualified as 'Unemployed'"]

[Text] During its fifth meeting, held on 26 October, the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM] discussed an updated draft of the Law on Employment. The most important amendment presented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy [MPiPS] concerns the new definition of unemployment and the resultant change in the range of people entitled to social assistance, when they lose their jobs.

Based on nearly a year's experience with the present law, the MPiPS is proposing to exclude from the unemployed category all those people going to school, except night school and extension. There is also a proposal to impose age limits, on the one hand, to include the concept of the unemployed young person and, on the other, to exclude from unemployment benefits those people who have reached the age where they are entitled to retirement benefits (60 for women, 65 for men).

The MPiPS further proposes to expand unemployment subsistence benefits to peasant-workers with farms of not more than one hectare. The privileges of receiving

benefits for training and credit for undertaking economic activity would also be transferred from the insurance law for these people.

The next proposal would be to restrict aid from the Labor Fund for enterprises employing the unemployed (investment work) to the limit set by the amount of the unemployment benefit plus the insurance premium. Similar restrictions also apply to employed graduates.

The Ministry of Finance [MF] rejected these proposals during the discussion. It was Deputy Minister Andrzej Podsiadlo's opinion that the proposals went far beyond what had been agreed upon during the discussion on the earlier version of the draft last June. The MF thinks these proposals greatly will expand the range of funds paid to the unemployed.

KERM recommended that another interministry conference be set up to reconcile estimates of the financial implications of the changes being proposed. KERM came out in favor of adopting the narrower definition of unemployment, for increasing the incentives for seeking work, and for introducing a time limit, beyond which people would no longer be entitled to benefits.

KERM also learned about Minister Artur Balazs's proposal to extend the scope of people entitled to collect family benefits in rural areas. Because the adoption of these proposals would greatly expand the public burden, KERM suggested a general review of the entire question of family benefits. MPiPS is working on proposals on this subject, but the Council of Ministers will discuss the 1991 budget first, and an assessment of the country's financial condition will determine whether these wishes are fulfilled.

Radio Solidarity Programming Chief on New Station

91EP0107A Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC* in Polish No 44, 2 Nov 90 p 18

[Interview with Jerzy Farner, Radio Solidarity chief of programming, by Joanna Kluzik; place and date not given: "Private Wave"]

[Text]

[Kluzik] How would you like to "bribe" listeners, to get them to listen to you instead of Polish Radio programs?

[Farner] We operate out of the very assumption that we are something other than a local station for Warsaw residents. So this leaves us free to take up issues that the all-Polish station doesn't have time for.

[Kluzik] Where did the idea come from?

[Farner] This radio station is a continuation of the underground radio station. When we were handling the formalities, we did not try to create a new institution, just to legalize the one that already existed. Five of the 28 employees are from the old team.

RADIO UKF 73,2MHz

Solidarność

WARSZAWA

| RADIO PROGRAM | | Saturday |
|---|--|---|
| Monday - Friday | | 5.00 - Good Morning, Warsaw |
| 5.00 - Good Morning, Warsaw | | 9.00 - Radio S Music |
| 9.00 - Radio S Music | | 11.00 - Our Report |
| 10.00 - Music from the "Reverse" (M) | | 13.00 - Hyde Park--Call In |
| 11.00 - Requested Items (T) | | 14.00 - Radio S Music |
| 11.30 - City's Kaleidoscope | | 15.00 - Something Different--magazine |
| 11.30 - Quiz | | 17.00 - Radio S Music |
| 12.30 - Today's Topic--Call In | | 18.00 - BBC Correspondence |
| 15.00 - Around Warsaw | | 18.30 - Radio S Music |
| 18.00 - BBC Correspondence | | 20.00 - Only for Youth: Disco |
| 18.30 - Radio S Music (M-TH) | | 22.00 - Dance? at 102 |
| 18.45 - Local (gmina) News (M-Th) | | 2.00 - End of Programming |
| 19.30 - Radio S Music | | Sunday |
| 20.00 - Only for Youth: Hardcore (M); Metal (T); Punk Rock (W); New Wave (Th); Rap & Reggae (F) | | 5.00 - Radio S Music |
| 22.00 - Radio S at night (M-Th); Music (F) | | 9.00 - Musical Reflections |
| 2.00 - End of Programming | | 10.00 - Radio S Music |
| News: Five minutes before the hour as well as 6.00 (BBC), 7.00 (BBC), 16.00 (BBC), 18.00 (BBC) | | 11.00 - Repetitions |
| | | 13.00 - Our House |
| | | 14.00 - Radio S Music |
| | | 15.00 - Good Ole Rock n' Roll |
| | | 16.00 - BBC--"Relations" magazine |
| | | 16.30 - Radio S Music |
| | | 20.00 - Only for Youth: Top Hits |
| | | 22.00 - Radio S at night |
| | | 2.00 - End of Programming |
| | | News: 5 mins. before the hour 9.55-22.00 as well as 8.00 (BBC), and 15.00 (BBC) |
| | | Telephone: 635-8888 |

[Kluzik] Does the "martial law" equipment still work?

[Farner] Yes. There are tape recorders, microphones, and a portable mixer. We ran the first tests on 18 June of this year. We wanted to know how far away people can hear us. The range turned out to be pretty variable. They received us in Grojec, but in Northern Praga [section of Warsaw on eastern bank of the Vistula] people could not hear us at all. Now that we have made some adjustments, our coverage extends out to a 50-kilometer area around Warsaw.

[Kluzik] Your hours of air time have been steadily increasing.

[Farner] At first our hours ran from 1300 to 1930; then from 0500 to 2200. The three-hour break was imposed on us. We only had one transmission block, and the equipment had to have time out. Now we are filling in the whole day.

[Kluzik] What does Radio Solidarity have to offer?

[Farner] An information service at five minutes before the hour, which is earlier than the rest.

[Kluzik] Is this a new idea or one "stolen" from others?

[Farner] Stolen, of course. We took a lot from Western regional radio stations. We are not ashamed of the fact that people in Poland actually do not know what local radio is.

[Kluzik] Other ideas....

[Farner] Different groups of people listen to the radio at different times of day. We are trying to adjust to this. For example, with the radio, everybody goes to work and wants to keep hearing what time it is, what the weather is like, what the headlines are. Beginning at 2000, when most adults are sitting watching the evening movie on television, Radio Solidarity serves up music for young people.

[Kluzik] Where does the radio station get its material support?

[Farner] From advertising.

[Kluzik] And is that enough?

[Farner] No. The radio station is a stock company with some foreign capital, but I do not want to go into financial matters here, because financial policy is a company secret.

[Kluzik] The [Solidarity] emblem was removed from the GAZETA WYBORCZA newspaper. Are you not afraid that Radio Solidarity will run into the same sort of problem?

[Farner] This enterprise is private 100 percent. They took the graphic symbol off GAZETA WYBORCZA, but we do not use any graphic symbols on the air, and there is no prohibition against verbal mention of Solidarity.

[Kluzik] But what about posters, signs, and advertising?

[Farner] We have the approval of the Mazowsze Region [of Solidarity].

[Kluzik] And censorship...?

[Farner] I beg your pardon? Withdraw the question. This is not the radio station of a union or of any party. The principal is this: We are providing information. If we want to comment on something, we invite person X to come to the studio, and we say clearly that this is the opinion of this concrete person. The listener always has the final word. We ask what the government's response is and wait for the phone to ring.

[Kluzik] Are the phone conversations recorded before being broadcast on the air?

[Farner] No. The program host talks to the listener, and they determine together how the conversation is going to go. Of course, it does sometimes happen that a caller says something entirely different on the air from what was said earlier, but that is a professional risk. We do not rule anyone out of bounds.

[Kluzik] Who phones in?

[Farner] I can tell you who does not phone in: college students. We will see if anything changes come October, the beginning of the academic year.

[Kluzik] Do the reporters make any mistakes?

[Farner] At times, of course, they do. For example, at 0805 an announcer recently told listeners that it was past 2000 hours.

Lignite: Prospects, Power Plant Use Examined

91EP0105A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 22 Oct 90 p II


[Article by Zbigniew Wyczasany: "Prospects for Brown Coal: A Cheap but Dirty Fuel"]

[Text] The Arab conflict caused by Iraq has shown the role of energy to the world even more graphically. The issue in that case is oil; however, there are repercussions virtually in all countries as far as opportunities to procure other sources of primary energy are concerned, from hard coal and gas, to bituminous shales and peat. Everybody, everywhere is calculating anew what makes sense for them.



Due to a protracted recession and inflationary processes, no rational strategy for the consumption of fuels and energy has been created in Poland to date. We are adrift, and political considerations obliterate the accomplishments of many generations.

At present, work is under way on yet another program (the latter is called Development Projections of the Energy Economy Until the Year 2010). As we may infer from these materials, Poland, a coal country, may switch within 20 years from being the greatest exporter of steam coal in Europe to being its importer. There is increasingly more talk about the first power plant using imported hard coal which will be built in the north of

MINING BASINS
LIGNITE DEPOSITS



LEGEND

-  Lignite Deposits in Active Basins
-  The More Important Documented Lignite Deposits

Poland on the Vistula. There is even a site for it in the locality of Opanie. However, let us not dwell on it.

What about another natural resource of Poland, brown coal? Even now, with production at about 75 or 76

million tons per year, it meets about 40 percent of the needs of common-use power generation.

Brown coal is produced and used mainly for power generation in the FRG and the United States, in Greece

and Spain, Poland and Romania, in the USSR and in China, as in Poland. The total worldwide production of brown coal which in 1938 amounted to slightly over 200 million tons per year now comes to about 1.2 billion tons.

A comprehensively interpreted criterion of profitability is the main factor in undertaking the production of brown coal. Until recently this did not include the issue of environmental protection. However, it turns out that the latest criteria of the World Bank for power facilities fired by brown coal, taking into account at the same time coal combustion with its complete desulfurization, continue to indicate that it is still competitive with coal and nuclear energy-based power generation.

For example, in the FRG the cost of producing one kilowatt-hour amounts to between 10.3 and 12 pfenigs in power plants burning brown coal (with products of

combustion fully desulfurized) whereas in power stations using hard coal, likewise with desulfurization, it is between 13.9 and 16 pfenigs.

Cost of Generating 1 MWh of Electricity

| Brown Coal | | Hard Coal | |
|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| Power Plant | Cost of 1 MWh (in Zlotys) | Power Plant | Cost of 1 MWh (in Zlotys) |
| Belchatow | 3,535 | Rybnik | 4,031 |
| Turow | 3,661 | Lower Odra | 4,306 |
| Patnow | 3,958 | Kozienice | 4,720 |
| Konin | 4,826 | Jaworzno | 4,995 |
| Adamow | 5,307 | Polanec | 5,310 |

A comparison of the costs of fuel necessary to produce 1 MWh of electricity is similar:

| Brown Coal | | | Hard Coal | | |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Power Plant | Fuel Cost | | Power Plant | Fuel Cost | |
| | Per 1 MWh of Electricity (in Zlotys) | As Percentage of Electricity Cost | | Per 1 MWh of Electricity (in Zlotys) | As Percentage of Electricity Cost |
| Turow | 2,187 | 68 | Rybnik | 2,172 | 63 |
| Belchatow | 2,524 | 71 | Polanec | 2,999 | 59 |
| Adamow | 2,627 | 50 | Lower Odra | 3,016 | 70 |
| Patnow | 2,851 | 72 | Jaworzno | 3,200 | 64 |
| Konin | 3,399 | 70 | Kozienice | 3,243 | 64 |

In 1988, 73.5 million tons of brown coal, with the average heat content of 8,065 kJ/kilogram, were produced in Poland (the equivalent of more than 20 million tons of standard fuel).

The use of brown coal-fired power plants under Polish conditions is more profitable than burning hard coal and fuel oil. Over several decades, we have mastered the construction and operation of strip mines. Moreover, our experience has borne fruit in the form of the construction of similar power stations abroad (in, among other places, Turkey).

Production statistics do not give us the whole picture. Brown coal is produced in Poland by strip mining. At present, the area of land occupied by these mines amounts to about 20,000 hectares, of which 6,253 hectares have been reclaimed so far. The ground water table drops in mining areas. Water in shallow, privately owned wells, most frequently sunk by digging, disappears. This issue can be resolved. Drinking water is brought in to all farms in the vicinity of mines by pipe.

Protecting the air against sulfurous and particulate emissions is the greatest problem. Due to such considerations, many lignite-fired power stations in the former territory of the GDR are to be closed in the immediate future. They do not have equipment entailed by environmental protection. On the other hand, Germany has an energy surplus and will meet the energy needs of the

eastern part of the country without difficulty. Such conditions do not exist in Poland. However, who can tell whether the closure of brown coal-fired power stations is in store for us as well. In the absence of pollution-control equipment, this will certainly be the case.

Fruit Crop Losses Lead to Steadily Decreasing Exports

91EP0100B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 24 Oct 90 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Bitter Fruit Harvests"]

[Text] Fruit harvests this year will total about 1.3 million tons. This figure is about 700,000 tons, or 38 percent, lower than last year. Orchard harvests are estimated to be no higher than 850,000 to 900,000 tons, or 40 to 45 percent lower than last year. Apple harvests are estimated at about 740,000 tons, compared to 1,312,000 tons last year. This year, the greatest declines in fruit production occurred in Nowy Sacz and Przemysl Voivodships, where there was a drop of more than 80 percent. Orchards in Grojec, a noted supplier of apples to both domestic and export markets, endured the spring frosts better.

This year's smaller fruit harvests will have an adverse impact on the fruit exports levels. Total exports of fresh fruits have been declining since 1986, when 250,000 tons

were exported. The following two years we exported about 100,000 tons of fruit, and last year only 34,200 tons. These figures were the result of the hard winter in 1987, and then of various climatic anomalies which had a detrimental impact on horticulture. These conditions will not improve our chances for such exports this year either.

Apple sales abroad have actually never been splendid for the growers. The Horticulture Cooperative in Grojec pays farmers 1,150 zlotys per kilogram of apples sold to the USSR. The same apples can be sold in Warsaw for

4,500 zlotys per kilogram. Orchard growers can obtain more for apples sold to Finland than for those sold to the USSR, but Finnish customers, on the other hand, are particular and demand very high quality. Because domestic prices are so competitive, Hortex will be sending the USSR only 7,000 to 8,000 of the 35,000 tons of apples under contract. Apple growers, especially those with the greatest foresight, have in turn been building storage plants and are now waiting to sell their apples at prices above the current level, once the declining supply so permits.

HUNGARY

Israeli Press Attache on Interstate Relations

91CH0202B Budapest REFORM in Hungarian
23 Nov 90 p 10

[Interview with Israeli Embassy Press Secretary Gabor Deak by FR; place and date not given: "A Bridge Must Be Built Between the Two Nations"—first paragraph is REFORM introduction]

[Excerpts] Gabor Deak is the newly appointed press secretary at the Israeli Embassy. [passage omitted] His job is to ensure that objective information is provided, and to build relations with the Hungarian press.

[FR] Ignorance is characteristic at present. In general, published reports deal only with high level meetings and events of a protocol character.

[Deak] This means something, considering the fact that during the past 20 years they preferred not even to put down in writing the name of the State of Israel. The situation is much better now that diplomatic relations have been established between our countries. Very little is known in Hungary about the way of life, the everyday struggles, and the public thought that defines Israel. The picture that has been flashed thus far was one-sided and false. For instance: Who took into consideration the fact that in our country there are between 200,000 and 300,000 citizens whose native language is Hungarian. Nowhere in the world could we find a small area with a concentration of so many Hungarians linked to their native tongue and to their origin. It would not hurt to establish permanent working relations. A new, but sad experience: The damages caused by drought could have been substantially reduced had they known and used the Israeli methods of irrigation in Hungary. The fact is that Israeli literature, the arts, music, and even more so Israel's colorful folklore are largely unknown in Hungary. These evolved in the place where Jews from various continents met. And at this point it is still ridiculous to talk about relationships in sports.

[FR] Most certainly, the Hungarian prime minister's visit to Israel will serve as a general "stimulant" insofar as relationships between our countries are concerned....

[Deak] I trust that his visit will exert a decisive influence. Increased tourism is a very good yardstick by which an approach between the two countries can be measured; this presents a real opportunity for better understanding and for becoming acquainted with each other.

[FR] Is there going to be a greater influx of Israeli capital to support the reconstruction of the Hungarian economy?

[Deak] I have no authority to respond to this question, but based on my experience I can say that one may expect serious initiatives.

Poverty Situation, Inequities Analyzed

91CH0140A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 8 Sep 90 p 18

[Article by Social Research Information Association (TARKI) Director Tamas Kolosi: "Poverty and Wealth: The Not-Equal Sign"—first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] Social inequities, in other words, the rich and the poor, also existed at the time when they officially should not have, states the author, head director of the Social Research Information Association [TARKI]. The inequities grew continuously of their own accord as well, and in the author's judgment "lending them a helping hand," that is to say, creating new poverties and fortunes under the aegis of changing the system should not be permitted.

Accelerated inflation creates the impression that inequities are growing by leaps and bounds in the broad masses [of people]. Even since the beginning of the 1980's, public opinion has held that they have been growing significantly, although objective data did not support this belief for a long time. In the last two years, however, the realignment of income levels has really taken off.

In the minds of many, reviewing the last 40 years, the distribution of income was the most even in the 1950's and 1960's, with inequities growing moderately in the 1970's and accelerating in the 1980's. But we cannot affirm this picture even if we disregard the most blatant inequities—which can be attributed to political causes—from the 1950's and 1960's.

Merely by looking at income distribution, we find that in 1962, the 10 percent of the population having the highest incomes had 5.8 times more income than the 10 percent with the lowest incomes. This ratio fell to 3.8 percent [as published] by 1982, then grew to 4.6 percent [as published] by 1987. The calculations must also include the fact that income stemming from continuous growth in the second economy, beginning in the mid-1960's, only appears in the statistical data with a great downward distortion. Taking this into account, income distribution at the start of the 1960's was more inequitable than it was by 1980, and the bulk of the inequities at the end of the 1980's corresponds to the findings from the early 1970's. Thus we can calculate that the indicator mentioned above had continued to grow to today's rate almost five times as fast, a figure that places Hungarian income inequities in the middle of the European range in an international context. Here in Hungary, inequities are somewhat larger than in prosperous Sweden or in the poor Balkan countries, and substantially smaller than in France or in Greece, whose standard of living is comparable to that of Hungarian.

If we divide the population very crudely into three large groups—the poor, the middle-class, and the well-to-do—we find the smallest changes among the poor. Almost 1 million people live below the subsistence level, according to official statistics, and another 1 million

below the so-called societal minimum. For the latter, based on current domestic conditions, it is expected that their standard of living can be safeguarded, but for those below the subsistence level, simple existence is already causing concern. These figures suggest that the number of those struggling with the concerns of existence has moderately increased by around 20 percent over [the past] seven years for those below the subsistence level, and by around 10 percent for those below the societal minimum. At the same time, the so-called relative income position for this stratum did not deteriorate in recent years. Hence, they are poor, but today they are not living more poorly as compared to the earlier average.

The changes within the middle class, however, are very large. Earlier research studies have shown that the peculiarity of the Hungarian social structure was precisely that the stable, real middle class was very small in number, and in recent years, its further bifurcation has accelerated. Its larger component is the "almost poor," while the smaller portion in recent years was not only able to stabilize its situation, but began to move upward.

Two changes can be observed in the wealthy population. On the one hand, its internal makeup is in transition, and on the other, during the past two years, a class has appeared in sizeable numbers that commands truly high incomes and is rapidly getting richer. In my estimation, the change in [economic] systems has up to now been a great jolt for the [continuing] existence of approximately 300 thousand families and has created new opportunities for about 150 thousand more families.

All of this data suggests that on the economic inequities side, the greatest social tension in Hungary is currently being caused by the masses [of people] in the middle class who continue to fall behind, and who view with greater and greater dislike not only those who are growing rich, but also those who succeeded in stabilizing their financial situation in the midst of the economic crisis and the change in system. All of this is supported by value-sociological testing, according to which, even today, it is much more attitudes toward the past than the subsequent demands made by the change in the [economic] system that fundamentally motivates the politically egalitarian behavior of 70 percent of the population. For example, results from TARKI's latest research show that three-quarters of those polled profess their faith in privatization, but half of those questioned would oppose placing their own place of work under private ownership.

The danger remains that the social demagoguery of the political parties will turn more and more forcefully against all of those who were not only successful people under the previous system, but who were able to preserve or convert their favored positions in spite of the change in power. A few passages from the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Justitia plan provide a good example of this. I am not thinking just of the general suspension of leadership mandates or the reevaluation of retirees, but of the trend of the values manifested by this

plan. In other words, when it demands that the income for the director of an enterprise, which is owned by at least 50 percent by the state, not be allowed to exceed the income of the president of the republic, what it wants to bring back is precisely the politically centered egalitarianism in the value structure of the past 40 years.

My concern here is not whether the most qualified managers were to be hounded out of the state sector, but whether that wouldn't mean squandering the state's assets. Nevertheless, aside from the countries of state socialism, is there a single nation in the world where this demand is being carried out? Yet it must be decided sooner or later whether a change of the political system should really be followed by a change in the economic and social system. The kind of systematic change in which the administration deals with the tension of an inequitable system, not by snatching back outstanding people [from the brink of ignominy] or by making concessions to the "jealousy of the proletariat," but by creating an economic environment which helps to increase prosperity, an active social policy, and an equitable, general, and proportionate sharing in taxation that does not promote the stifling of performance.

POLAND

Clericalism Seen as Potential Problem for Society

91EP0106A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
20-21 Oct 90 p 5

[Article by Grzegorz Polak: "Do We Have Clericalism in Poland?"]

[Text] "We priests bless everything we can in this country, eagerly waving our aspergillum left and right. Is this only a reaction to the long absence of signs of faith in public life or a manifestation of growing clericalism in Poland?"

This is how Father Michal Czajkowski began his remarks during the recent panel discussion in Warsaw on the clergy in Poland. Professors from the Academy of Catholic Theology, SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] representatives, as well as our own and foreign journalists took part in the panel organized by the Foundation of German Liberals which is patronized by the West German FDP [Free Democratic Party].

According to Father Czajkowski, clericalism is not the quiet manifestation of faith characterized by respect for others. A Christian cannot agree to the "privatization" of faith; the closing up of religion in the sacristy. Clericalism is also not the fulfillment by the Catholic Church of prophetic functions. In the past, this took the form of protest and the defense of the rights of people wronged by the regime, whereas today, the church can fulfill this function by becoming the champion of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

However, there are ambiguous situations where the church may be accused of clericalizing public life. This pertains, in particular, to the method of introducing religious instruction to schools and the Antiabortion Law. "Is the demanding by us of principles of great importance to us to be considered clericalization?," asked Fr. Czajkowski. "If a Christian is convinced that life begins at the moment of conception then no one should be surprised that he fights for the life of unborn children. The way in which he does this is the only issue that remains up for discussion."

The meeting of the main political figures with the Primate [of Poland] was also not a sign of clericalism. If it had been a question of designating the political agenda by the hierarchy then it would, obviously, be clerical interference in public affairs. Our Primate, who to a certain degree fulfills the role of an interrex during the period of weak presidency, was only concerned with mellowing the social mood.

On the other hand, we can speak of clericalization when Catholic triumphalism and the restoration of prewar conditions occurs. Some groups try to ideologize faith, manipulate church authority and at times propagate anti-Christian thought such as nationalism and anti-Semitism.

"Clerical allergy" is a disturbing phenomenon in church circles. Critical remarks on the subject of the church and the clergy are being condemned from the pulpits as attacks on the church. The misgivings of many sincere Catholics about the introduction of religion to schools have been treated by some bishops as hostile voices resulting from Communist upbringing.

"The best remedy for clericalism is caution and restraint. A priest should not always agree to participate in ceremonies. I had no objections when I was asked to dedicate a KIK [Catholic Intellectuals Club] local. I refused, however, to dedicate a 'Solidarity' local. I argued that the trade union belongs not only to Catholics and could offend the religious feelings of others," stated Fr. Cajkowski.

"A remedy for clerical temptations is ecumenism. Where possible, the clergy of other religions should be invited. There are many possibilities of the common expression of faith: prayer, common services. Overburdening our public life with the rites of mass constitutes not only a lack of respect for those of other faiths or for nonbelievers but also a lack of respect for God because the Holy Mass then sometimes changes to a celebration of worship."

The consistent promotion of lay people in the church can also be a remedy for clericalism. "Meanwhile," stated Fr. Alfons Skowronek, "some circles of lay Catholics exhibit an urge toward clericalism; they exert all out efforts for the support of the hierarchy."

Fr. Skowronek presented a definition of clericalism: shifting the demands of the clergy to the political sphere and abusing clerical authority in striving to dominate over others. In Poland, we are not dealing with clericalism understood in such terms. Opinions appearing in the mass media that

"Khomeinization" of political life has taken place in Poland and that the Primate of Poland is a Polish ayatollah were described by Fr. Skowronek as a surprise attack by the posthumous successors of the past period. During martial law, the church offered asylum to everyone and the Communist authorities did not dare to tag it with the label of clericalism. There were 12 pastors in the GDR government and no one protested there against clericalism.

According to Zbigniew Siemiatkowski from SdRP, a symptom of clericalism is the church's involvement in political haggling and fighting. Up to now, the power of the church was in that it was above divisions. Today, individual political groups want to pull the church into their game and gain its support to create the impression that their strength depends on how many masses will be said and how many hierarchs will take part in the congress of this or another party.

According to Siemiatkowski, the temptation to legally sanction Catholic norms is also evident. Nonetheless, the church has the greatest chance to bring about a social moral renaissance. "I do not see other forces that could manage this," stated Siemiatkowski.

The following defended arguments about the clericalization of Polish public life: a journalist from TRYBUNA, Iwona Konarska, and a correspondent from FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Stefan Dietrich. According to Konarska, Poland is heading in the direction of a Catholic state. The church is imposing its views on all of society. Church representatives are characterized by paternalism—they act like a father who knows everything better than his children.

Stefan Dietrich stated that in Poland, the bounds between the right of expression in public life and the clericalization of political life have been crossed. "Does the church," asked the German journalist, "realize the weight of the voice it carries in this country and does it know that this is a voice that crushes all resistance?" "I have the feeling," continued Dietrich, "that the church is giving in more and more to the temptation of attaining by legal and political means that which it cannot attain through teaching."

According to the undersigned, there is no clericalism in Poland, although, its threat does exist. Clericalism denotes political aspirations of the clergy. In our country, this concept is used to describe any and all attempts of the church to influence public life to which a significant part of society including not too infrequently Catholics themselves have an allergic and hysterical reaction. Consequently, anticlerical attitudes come into prominence whose repercussion takes the form of the circulating opinion that the "Red" dictatorship has been replaced with "black" [clergy] dictatorship.

Certain Catholic circles which try to pull the church into the political game and create the impression that without the church's blessing nothing can be done in this country are to blame for this state of affairs.

22161

SPRINGFIELD, VA
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
ATTN: PROCESS 103
NTIS

22
22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.